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Summary
For FY2006, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
requested $16.456 billion.  That amount was a 2.4% increase over the $16.070 billion
(adjusted for the rescission) appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-447).  NASA also received a $126 million supplemental for damages
caused by the 2004 Florida hurricanes, yielding a total of $16.196 billion for FY2005.
The FY2006 request was 1.6% above that amount.  By comparison, last year the
White House projected that NASA’s budget would increase by 4.7%.  NASA
submitted a FY2006 budget amendment on July 15; total funding for the agency did
not change.  The Administration included $324.8 million for NASA in the October
28, 2005 reallocation package that includes funds for hurricane relief.
The House and Senate have passed the final version of the FY2006 Science,
State, Justice, Commerce appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), which includes NASA.
It approves $16,456.8 million ($500,000 above  the request), and is subject to a
0.28% across-the-board rescission.  Congress also is debating a NASA authorization
bill.  The House-passed version (H.R. 3070)  includes $510 million more than the
request; the Senate-passed version  (S. 1281) approves $100 million above the
request.  NASA is currently funded under a Continuing Resolution (P.L. 109-77).
Congressional debate over NASA is centered on plans to implement the Vision
for Space Exploration, announced by President Bush in January 2004.  The Vision
calls for NASA to return humans to the Moon by 2020, and someday send them to
Mars.  President Bush did not propose adding significant funding to NASA’s
five-year budget plan to implement the Vision.  Instead, the agency must redirect
funds from its other activities. NASA’s resources are being strained by that decision,
increased funding requirements for returning the space shuttle to flight status, cost
growth in existing programs, and the need to fund congressionally-directed items. 
NASA Administrator Dr. Michael Griffin states repeatedly that NASA cannot
afford all the programs on its plate, and priorities must be set.  He also is changing
the emphasis on some of the Vision-related activities. For example, he is accelerating
development of a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to reduce an expected multi-year
gap between when the space shuttle is to be terminated (2010) and the availability of
the CEV.  During that gap, the United States would not have its own ability to launch
astronauts, and thus would be dependent on Russia for crew transportation to the
International Space Station (ISS).   To pay for accelerating the CEV, Dr. Griffin is
reducing funding for other Vision-related activities such as developing nuclear power
and propulsion systems (Project Prometheus) or performing research on ISS.
NASA’s FY2006 budget request also assumed a reduction of about 2,500 NASA
civil servants by the beginning of FY2007.  
This report will be updated.  An abbreviated version is available as CRS Report
RS22063.  
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1 NASA’s operating plans are discussed below under Overview of NASA’s FY2006
Budget Request.
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2006 Budget Request: 
Description, Analysis, and Issues for 
Congress
Preface
This report discusses the major issues debated in the context of NASA’s
FY2006 request for $16.456 billion, a 2.4% increase over the $16.070 billion
appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (adjusted for the
rescission).  NASA also received $126 million in a FY2005 supplemental for
damages from the 2004 Florida hurricanes, giving it a total of $16.196 billion for
FY2005.  The FY2006 request was a 1.6% increase above that total.  By comparison,
last year’s budget submission projected that the agency would receive a 4.7%
increase for FY2006.  NASA submitted a FY2006 budget amendment on July 15,
2005; total funding requested did not change, only how it is allocated within the
agency.   In the final version of the FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce
Appropriations Act, which includes NASA, Congress approved $16,456.8 million
for NASA, $500,000 above the request.  The appropriation is subject to a 0.28%
across-the-board rescission. The appropriations bill is awaiting signature by the
President.  Congress continues to debate a NASA authorization bill (H.R. 3070/S.
1281).
NASA substantially changed its budget structure in the FY2006 budget request,
as it has done repeatedly over the past several years.  The agency also shifted to “full
cost accounting” in FY2004.   These changes make comparisons across fiscal years
at the program level virtually impossible.  Comparing the FY2005 appropriation and
the FY2006 request alone is difficult.  In its FY2006 request, NASA provided
estimated FY2005 funding figures, taken from its Initial Operating Plan (December
23, 2004), using the same structure as the FY2006 budget to enable comparisons
between those years.   However, NASA’s FY2005 spending plans have changed
significantly since then, as explained in periodic updates to the operating plan.1  The
FY2005 operating plan updates are presented in the budget structure NASA used for
FY2005, not FY2006, with no”crosswalk” between the old and new structures. Thus,
those numbers cannot be incorporated into the tables in this report.  Major changes
are discussed in the text, however. 
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2 The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), chartered in 1915, served as
the nucleus for NASA.  The day that NASA began operations, five NACA research facilities
were transferred to NASA, and all continue to operate today:  Ames Research Center,
Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn Research Center (formerly Lewis Research Center),
Langley Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility.  Two Army organizations also were
transferred to NASA within a year of the agency’s creation: the Development Operations
Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency — the “von Braun team” — which
developed the Jupiter C launch vehicle that placed the first U.S. satellite into orbit on
January 31, 1958 (prior to NASA’s creation), now called Marshall Space Flight Center; and
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which developed that satellite (Explorer 1).
The most prominent issues in the FY2006 budget are carry-overs from the
FY2005 debate: whether to approve President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration”
to return astronauts to the Moon by 2020 and then go on to Mars and “worlds
beyond”; returning the space shuttle to flight status following the February 2003
space shuttle Columbia tragedy; the future of U.S. use of the International Space
Station; and whether to use the shuttle to service the Hubble Space Telescope.
Another major issue this year is the future of NASA’s aeronautics research programs,
which are slated for significant reductions.
Several other CRS reports are available on NASA-related topics, and are
referenced herein.  For convenience, a list is provided in Appendix A.  An
abbreviated version of this report is available as CRS Report RS22063, The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration: Overview, FY2006 Budget in Brief, and Key
Issues for Congress, by Marcia Smith and Daniel Morgan.
FY2005 estimated, and FY2006 requested, budget figures are from NASA’s
budget justification documents [http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/index.html] and,
where indicated, from a budget amendment submitted by the White House
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_7_15_05.pdf]
on July 15, 2005.  Program descriptions are condensed from material provided by
NASA in that or previous budget justifications, and previous CRS reports in this
series. 
Introduction to NASA
NASA was created by the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-
568), and opened its doors on October 1, 1958.2  NASA’s charter is to conduct
civilian space and aeronautics activities.  Military space and aeronautics activities are
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community.
The organizations cooperate in some areas of technology development and
occasionally have joint programs.  
NASA began operations almost exactly one year after the Soviet Union ushered
in the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on October
4, 1957.  In the 47 years that have elapsed, NASA has conducted far reaching
programs in human and robotic spaceflight, technology development, and scientific
CRS-3
3 Despite its name, JPL’s primary role for NASA is developing earth-orbiting and planetary
exploration spacecraft, and managing the Deep Space Network, which tracks and
communicates with planetary spacecraft.
research.  The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
It has nine major field centers around the country (see Figure 1): 
! Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, which also manages
Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain View, CA.;
! Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA;
! Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, OH;
! Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, which also
manages the Goddard Institute of Space Studies (New York, NY),
the Independent Validation and Verification  Facility (Fairmont,
WV), and the Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops, VA); 
! Johnson Space Center, near Houston, TX, which also manages
NASA activities at the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands, NM;
! Kennedy Space Center, near Cape Canaveral, FL;
! Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA; 
! Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL, which oversees the
Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, LA (operated by
Lockheed Martin);  and 
! Stennis Space Center, in Mississippi, near Slidell, LA.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, often counted as a 10th NASA
center, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) operated for
NASA by the California Institute of Technology.3  Figure 1 shows the locations of
these facilities.  See [http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/OrganizationIndex.html]
for links to all of NASA’s facilities.
Stennis Space Center and the Michoud Assembly Facility were both
significantly impacted by Hurricane Katrina  in August 2005.  Stennis is NASA’s
primary rocket engine test facility, including the Space Shuttle Main Engines
(SSMEs). Michoud is a government-owned, contractor-operated facility, operated for
NASA by Lockheed Martin.  It is the site where space shuttle external tanks are
assembled.  According to its September 30 updated to the FY2005 operating plan,
NASA estimates that it will cost $760 million to repair damages and relocate staff.
The agency shifted $100 million in FY2005 funds ($85 million from ISS Crew/Cargo
and $15 million from the Shuttle Life Extension Program) to begin hurricane
recovery efforts, which it hopes to repay to those accounts from funds made available
through an emergency supplemental appropriation.  The rescission and reallocation
package submitted to Congress by the Bush Administration on October 28,  2005
contains $324.8 million for NASA.  The source of the remaining funds that NASA
needs for hurricane recovery is unclear.
According to information supplied to CRS by NASA in March 2005, and
NASA’s workforce website [http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm],
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4 A NASA official told the House Science Committee on February 17, 2005 that NASA had
18,000 employees, an apparent reference to full-time permanent (FTP) employees, not the
more commonly used “full time equivalents” (FTEs), which are budget-related estimates of
the number of work years required to achieve agency missions and objectives.  According
to data provided to CRS by NASA in March 2005, the FY2005 NASA budget funds 19,227
FTEs, and the FY2006 budget would fund 18,798 FTEs; the actual number of employees
was 18,932, of which 17,475 were FTPs.  Those data also show that NASA plans to reduce
its FTE level to 16,738 by FY2007, a reduction of 2,489 from its current level.  Other NASA
information indicates that as many as 2,673 positions may be eliminated.
NASA employs approximately 19,000 full time equivalent (FTE) civil servants.4  The
website also estimates that NASA has 40,000 on-site and near-site support
contractors and grantees.  Significant workforce cutbacks are planned by the
beginning of FY2007 as NASA “transforms” itself to implement President Bush’s
Vision for Space Exploration.  That issue is discussed below.
NASA is headed by an Administrator.   Dr. Michael Griffin was sworn in as
NASA’s 11th Administrator on April 14, 2005.   Dr. Griffin has extensive experience
in military and civilian space programs, and has served in a number of private sector
and government capacities (including previous service at NASA).  Immediately prior
to his appointment as Administrator, he was Space Department Head at Johns
Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory.   His predecessor as Administrator
was Mr. Sean O’Keefe.  
NASA Headquarters is currently organized into four Mission Directorates:
Aeronautics Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations.   NASA
Headquarters’ current organization chart is provided in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1.  NASA Facilities
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Figure 2.  NASA’s Organization Chart
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NASA’s Historical Budget
Since its creation in 1958, NASA has experienced periods of budget growth and
decline, some of which were dramatic.  Figure 3 displays the agency’s budget
history, both in current year dollars (i.e., unadjusted for inflation) and in constant
2005 dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation).  In the early 1960s, as the nation strived to
put an American on the Moon by 1969, NASA’s budget increased rapidly, peaking
at $5.25 billion (current dollars) in FY1965.  Then, as other national priorities gained
precedence, NASA’s budget declined sharply to about $3 billion (current dollars) by
FY1974.  Subsequently, it increased steadily for almost two decades (the one-year
spike in 1987 was to build a replacement space shuttle orbiter), but declined in the
mid-1990s as efforts to restrain federal funding took hold.  It rose gradually (in
current dollars) thereafter.  President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration called for
NASA’s budget to increase by about 5% in FY2005-FY2007.  That occurred for
FY2005, but the FY2006 budget request is less than what had been projected last
year (see below).
Source:  Current dollars for 1959-2003 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY2003; for 2004-2005, from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2006.
Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2005 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP
(chained) price index. The spike in NASA funding in 1987 was to cover the costs of building a
replacement orbiter after the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger tragedy.










Does not include Transition Quarter.
Figure 3.  NASA Budget Authority FY1959-2004 — 
Current and Constant Dollars (in $millions)
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5 For example, see “U.S. House Republican Pushes for Spending Change,” Reuters,
February 9, 2005 (via Factiva); and Carl Hulse, “There’s No Talk of Dollars in This Battle
Over the Budget,” New York Times, February 16, 2005 (via Factiva).
Table 1.  NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years (1996-2005)
















Source:  Current dollars for 1959-2003 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY2003; for 2004-2005, from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2006.
Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2005 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP
(chained) price index.
Congressional Committee Reorganizations
Historically, NASA was part of the appropriations bill covering the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
and Independent Agencies, including the National Science Foundation and the
Environmental Protection Agency. The House and Senate appropriations
subcommittees with oversight over that bill were dubbed the “VA-HUD-IA”
subcommittees.  In the 109th Congress, the House decided to reorganize its
Appropriations Committee, reducing the number of subcommittees from 13 to 10.
The VA-HUD-IA subcommittee was one of those abolished. NASA now is part of
the newly established Science, State, Justice, Commerce (SSJC) subcommittee.
Press accounts trace the origin of the reorganization to dissatisfaction by
Representative Tom DeLay (then House Majority Leader) with deep cuts for NASA
recommended by the VA-HUD-IA subcommittee in the FY2005 deliberations, and
a desire to eliminate the funding competition between NASA and other popular
programs such as housing and veterans medical care.5   Representative DeLay is a
strong supporter of NASA.  (See CRS Report RL32676, The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration’s FY2005 Budget Request: Description, Analysis, and
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Issues for Congress, by Marcia Smith and Daniel Morgan, for more on the FY2005
congressional deliberations.)
The Senate also eliminated its VA-HUD-IA subcommittee, but retained a total
of 12 subcommittees (down from 13).  NASA was moved into the newly established
Commerce, Justice, and Science (CJS) subcommittee.  The Senate CJS
subcommittee’s jurisdiction is different from its House counterpart in that the House
subcommittee includes the State Department.
NASA’s Senate authorizing committee, the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, also reorganized its subcommittee structure.   Previously,
NASA was part of the Science, Technology and Space Subcommittee.   In this case,
the committee added several new subcommittees, and technology issues were moved
to a different one.   The subcommittee that oversees NASA is now named the Science
and Space Subcommittee.  The House Science Committee, which authorizes NASA
activities in the House, maintained the same structure as in the 108th Congress, with
NASA issues under the purview of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee.
Overview of NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request
NASA requested $16.456 billion for FY2006, a 2.4% increase over the $16.070
billion (adjusted for the rescission) appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447).  NASA also received $126 million in a FY2005
supplemental (P.L. 108-324) for hurricane relief associated with the 2004 hurricanes,
giving it a total of $16.196 billion for FY2005.   The FY2006 request was a 1.6%
increase above that total.  Last year, NASA was projected to receive a 4.7% increase
for FY2006.  NASA substantially changed its budget structure again in the FY2006
request, as it has each year for the past several years, making comparisons across
fiscal years difficult.  Footnotes to Table 2 explain the changes from FY2005. 
NASA submitted a FY2006 budget amendment on July 15, 2005, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_7_15_05.pdf].
It reflects, in part, the shifting of two programs into the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD):  ISS Crew/Cargo services ($168 million) from the International
Space Station theme in the Space Operations Mission Directorate, and the Lunar
Robotic Exploration Program ($135 million) from the Solar System Exploration
theme in the Science Mission Directorate.  These changes are consistent with the
statement in NASA’s May 10, 2005 operating plan update that these moves had been
made for FY2005.  Thus, the FY2006 funding request for the ESMD increased by
$303 million in the budget amendment.  The budget amendment made a number of
other changes, which are discussed elsewhere in this report as appropriate.
Some of the fields in Table 2 are necessarily blank because of how the various
congressional committees acted on the bills.  Increases and decreases for specific
programs were noted in the text of the House and Senate committee reports
accompanying the appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), but overall funding levels were
identified only at the account level.  The Senate-passed authorization bill (S. 1281)
identifies funding only at the account level, except that Sec. 131 specifies that no less
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than $5,341.2 million in FY2006 is to be spent on science.  The House-passed
authorization bill (H.R. 3070) creates a different account structure than that used in
NASA’s request, and it cannot be adapted for use in Table 2.  Therefore, Table 2
shows only the total for the agency recommended in H.R. 3070.  See Table 3 for the
structure and funding levels recommended in H.R. 3070. 
Table 2.  NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request




















Exploration **7,619 **9,829 9,726 9,761 9,761 9,661
Science a 5,527 5,341 5,341
Aeronautics 906 852
Biol. and Phys. Research 1,004  — b
Exploration Systems 25 3,469
Education 217 167
Exploration Capabilities **8,358 **6,595 6,713 6,603 6,663 6,863
Space Operations 6,704 6,595
 — Space Shuttle 4,543 4,531
 — International Space Station 1,676 1,689
 — Space and Flight Support 485 376
Exploration Systems 1,654  — c
Inspector General 31 32 32 32 32 32
Total regular appropriations 16,070 16,456 16,471 16,396 16,457 16,966 16,556
FY2005 Hurricane Suppl.† 126
Grand total 16,196 16,456 16,471 16,396 16,457 16,966 16,556
Source:  FY2005 Estimate and FY2006 Request from the Office of Management and Budget
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/nasa.html], except for space shuttle, space station,
and space and flight support, which are from NASA’s FY2006 budget justification.  Grand Total was
added by CRS.  The FY2006 request  figures are adjusted for the July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
Appropriations and authorization figures are from NASA FY2006 funding bills (H.R. 2862, H.R.
3070, and S. 1281) and associated committee reports.  The conference amount is not adjusted for the
0.28% rescission included in H.R. 2862.  Totals may not add due to rounding. 
* Figures in this column are from the December 23, 2004 version of NASA’s FY2005 operating plan,
as provided in NASA’s FY2006 budget justification documents.  Updates to the operating plan
are routinely submitted to Congress; the most recent version is available at
[http://www1.nasa.gov/about/budget/].  The  updates are presented  in the budget structure used
for the FY2005 budget, however, and cannot be used to update this table (which is in the
FY2006 budget structure).
** The FY2005 totals for the SA&E and Exploration Capabilities accounts are different from those
in the table included in NASA’s FY2006 budget justification documents because OMB shows
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6   NASA requested, but did not receive, the same transfer authority for FY2006.
7 The December 23, 2004 plan was publicly released by NASA in February 2005 and is used
in NASA’s FY2006 budget justification, available at [http://www1.nasa.gov/about/budget/].
8 NASA operating plan updates are routinely submitted to Congress.  NASA’s budget
w e b s i t e  s o me t i me s  has  a  l i nk  t o  t h e  mo s t  r e c e n t  ve r s i o n
[http://www1.nasa.gov/about/budget/], although the most recent, dated September 30, 2005,
is not yet available there.
the shift of “Exploration Systems” from one account to the other.  The NASA table uses the
FY2006 budget structure without showing a “trace” between last year’s budget presentation and
this year’s.  Since the OMB data show that trace, and include FY2004, they are used in this
report.
† For the 2004 Florida hurricanes.
a.  In the FY2006 request, “Science” incorporates the former Space Science and Earth Science line
items.
b.  In the FY2006 request, Biological and Physical Research became part of Exploration Systems.
c.  In the FY2006 request, funding for Exploration Systems was moved into the SA&E account.
Congress gave NASA significant latitude in how it could spend its FY2005
funding.  The conference report referred to it as “unrestrained transfer authority”
between NASA’s two major budget accounts.6  NASA was directed to notify
Congress of how it planned to spend the money, and did so through the traditional
process of submitting periodic “operating plans.”  An Initial Operating Plan was sent
to Congress on December 23, 2004,7 and it was used to show FY2005 funding figures
for various activities in the NASA’s FY2006 budget submission.  Several updates
were subsequently submitted, the most comprehensive of which were the May 10 and
September 30, 2005 versions.8 
Despite the fact that NASA received approximately the same amount that it
requested in FY2005, the agency was under significant funding constraints.  As
noted, $126 million of the total was a supplemental to help NASA recover from the
hurricanes that damaged NASA facilities at Kennedy Space Center, FL in 2004.  The
NASA FY2005 budget was subject to an across-the-board rescission, reducing the
appropriated level from $16.200 billion to $16.070 billion.   More than $1 billion in
other funding was used for activities that were not included in the FY2005 request:
increased costs for returning the shuttle to flight status ($762 million);
congressionally directed items (approximately $400 million, including $291 million
to service the Hubble Space Telescope); and cost increases in other NASA programs.
NASA Administrator Griffin testified to the Senate Appropriations CJS
subcommittee on May 12, 2005, about one month after he took office.  His statement
covered both the FY2006 request, and the May 10 update to the FY2005 operating
plan.  He emphasized that NASA does not have sufficient money to fund all the
programs it has on its plate for FY2005, and priorities must be set.  His priorities are
discussed below.
As noted by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the House
Science Committee, in their reports on NASA’s funding bills  (see below), NASA’s
FY2006 budget justification documents contained significantly less detail than in
previous years.  The committees directed NASA to provide more detail in the future.
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However, because of that lack of detail in publicly available documents, it is not
always possible in the lists below of committee actions to indicate the amount that
was requested for a particular activity. 
Appropriations Action on the FY2006 Request
House (H.R. 2862).  The House SSJC appropriations subcommittee marked
up its version of the FY2006 appropriations bill on May 24, 2005.  It was reported
from the full committee on June 10 (H.R. 2862, H.Rept. 109-118), and passed the
House on June 16.  The committee recommended, and the House approved, $16.471
billion for NASA, a net increase of $15 million above the request.  In total, the House
added $64.76 million for the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account, and cut
$50 million from the Exploration Capabilities account as follows:
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration
! An increase of $30 million for the Glory earth sciences mission ($5
million was requested);
! An increase of $10 million for the Space Interferometry Mission;
! An increase of $54 million for aeronautics research, restoring it to
its FY2005 level ($906 million);
! An increase of $2 million for education programs ($167 million was
requested);
! An increase of $50 million for continuation of unspecified
congressionally-directed programs that were terminated in the
budget request;
! A decrease of $25 million from exploration systems research and
technology ($919 million was requested);
! A decrease of $25 million from human systems research and
technology ($807 million was requested);
! A decrease of $31 million from corporate administrative costs, of
which $10 million is from the Office of Advanced Planning and
Integration, which the committee said was being eliminated; and
! A direction that $10 million of the funds provided for non-
programmatic construction of facilities be allocated for the Institute
for Scientific Research, Inc. for construction of research facilities.
Exploration Capabilities
! A decrease of $10 million from the International Space Station
($1.86 billion was requested);
! A decrease of $10 million from ISS Crew/Cargo Services (included
in the ISS request above);
! A decrease of $10 million from Rocket Propulsion Testing ($69
million was requested);
! A decrease of $10 million from Space Communications ($173
million was requested); and
! A decrease of $10 million from Launch Services ($124 million was
requested), but none can be taken from the Small Payload Launch
program.
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Senate (H.R. 2862).  The Senate CJS appropriations subcommittee marked
up its version of H.R. 2862 on June 21, and the bill was reported from the full
committee on June 23 (S.Rept. 109-88).   The Senate passed it on September 15. The
bill approved a net cut of $60 million from the request, adding $100 million for the
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account, and cutting $160 million from the
Exploration Capabilities account.  The committee’s report lists several specific
increases, but only two specific decreases, which do not total the $60 million net
reduction. The report makes a number of recommendations about funding levels, and
in some cases directs NASA to spend funding in a certain manner.  In many cases,
these do not involve increases above a requested funding level, but instead are
instructions on how to spend the funds.  In other cases, it is not clear if it is an
increase, or a specified allocation. 
Science, Aeronautics and Exploration
! An increase of $250 million for a Hubble servicing mission (none
was requested for a servicing mission, although $191 million is
requested for the Hubble program);
! An increase of $30 million for the National Center for Advanced
Manufacturing;
! An increase of $15 million for Earth Science Applications ($52
million was requested) was included in a recommendation of
“$102,837,000 million within this account to supplement the areas
of earth science and exploration”;
! A direction that $50 million be allocated for unspecified
congressionally-directed initiatives terminated in the budget request;
! A direction that $20 million of Exploration Systems funding be used
for the evaluation of alternative small spacecraft technologies with
the potential for dramatically lowering planetary exploration costs;
! A recommendation that $25 million be used to continue hypersonic
engine technology research (none was requested);
! A direction that the Research Partnership Centers and the University
Research Engineering and Technology Institutes be funded at the
same level as in FY2005 (precise figures were not provided either in
NASA’s budget documentation or in the committee’s report);
! A recommendation that within the funds for education, $12 million
be for EPSCoR, $29.55 million for the Space Grant program, and
$54.233 million for other education-related activities (EPSCoR and
Space Grant are discussed later in this report, the total requested for
education is $167 million);
! A recommendation that $10 million be allocated to research and
development for integrated radiation shielding protection,
regenerative environmental control and life support systems,
advanced life support air revitalization, and integrated vehicle health
management through the ECLSS Life Test program office;
! A recommendation that, within the funds provided, $20 million be
allocated for the Propulsion Research Laboratory to perform nuclear
thermal propulsion systems development, and research on other
advanced nuclear power propulsion; and
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! A decrease of $34 million (the entire request) for the Centennial
Challenges program.
Exploration Capabilities
! A decrease of $160 million (the entire request as identified NASA’s
original FY2006 budget documents) from ISS Crew/Cargo Services.
Conference.  The conference report on the bill was filed on November 7, and
passed the House on November 9 and the Senate on November 16.  It approves
$16,456.8 million, a $500,000 increase above the request.  Congress added
approximately $500 million for various activities, and cut the same amount in
NASA’s section of the bill.
All discretionary accounts in the bill are subject to a 0.28% across-the-board
rescission, a reduction of about $46 million for NASA.  The bill also directs the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to transfer $27 million
to NASA for building and infrastructure improvements.  Other funding measures
could similarly change the amount available to NASA in FY2006.  For the purposes
of this report, only the funding provided to NASA in the NASA section of H.R. 2862
will be discussed, unless otherwise noted. 
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration
Specified increases are — 
! $280 million for congressionally directed priorities
! $60 million for aeronautics research
! $50 million for the Hubble servicing mission
! $30 million for the Glory earth science mission
! $20 million for the National Center for Advanced Manufacturing
! $20 million for alternative small spacecraft technology
! $15 million for the Propulsion Research Lab
! $15 million for earth science competitive grants
! $12.2 million for the Space Grant program
! $10 million for the Space Interferometry Mission
! $10 million for the Institute for Scientific Research
! $8.2 million for EPSCoR
! $5 million for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, and 
! $5 million for the Living with a Star program. 
Specified decreases are — 
! $200 million from Project Prometheus
! $90 million general reduction
! $34 million from the Centennial Challenges program
! $26 million from corporate G&A expenses
! $25 million from exploration research and technology
! $25 million from human systems research and technology;
! $25 million from the Discovery program
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! $15 million from optical communications
Exploration Capabilities
The following reductions are specified:
! $80 million from the International Space Station (including $60
million from the ISS Crew/Cargo Services line)
! $10 million from space communications; and
! $10 million general reduction
Authorization Action on the FY2006 Request
Congress is debating an authorization bill for NASA.  The House-passed version
(H.R. 3070, H.Rept. 109-173) is a two-year bill providing funding for FY2006 and
FY2007.  The Senate-passed version (S. 1281, S.Rept. 109-108) is a five-year bill,
for FY2006-2010.  The pending authorization bills contain extensive policy
provisions that are too numerous to include in this report.  This report summarizes
only the provisions that affect the major issues identified herein.  The following
paragraphs pertain to funding recommendations in the bills.  Policy recommendations
are addressed in later sections of this report as appropriate.  The last NASA
authorization act was enacted in 2000 and covered FY2000-2002 (P.L. 106-391). 
House (H.R. 3070).  H.R. 3070, as passed by the House on July 22, 2005,
authorizes funding for FY2006 and FY2007.
Committee Action.  As reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept
109-173), the total for FY2006 was the same as approved in the House version of the
appropriations bill (see above) — $16.471 billion, a $15 million increase over the
request.  The level for FY2007 was the same as the projected request in NASA’s
budget documents — $16.962 billion.  As discussed below, these figures changed
significantly in the House-passed version of the bill.
During committee markup, an amendment in the nature of a substitute was
adopted that reflected a compromise between H.R. 3070 as approved by the Space
and Aeronautics Subcommittee on June 29, and H.R. 3250 (Gordon), a Democratic
substitute that was introduced after subcommittee markup.  Most Democratic
members of the subcommittee abstained from voting on H.R. 3070 during
subcommittee markup because they said they had insufficient time to review it.   The
amended version of H.R. 3070 that cleared the full committee is quite different from
the earlier version of H.R. 3070, and from H.R. 3250.
The amended bill adopts the budget structure proposed in H.R. 3250, which is
different from the one used in NASA’s FY2006 budget request. Instead of three
accounts (Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration; Exploration Capabilities; and
Inspector General), the bill creates four accounts: Science, Aeronautics and
Education; Exploration Systems; Space Operations; and Inspector General.  Thus,
funding for “exploration” would be in its own account, instead of with science,
aeronautics and education.  According to comments at the markup, the intent is to
create budgetary “firewalls” that would require closer congressional scrutiny if
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funding is shifted from one set of activities (e.g., science, aeronautics and education)
into another (e.g., exploration).  The goal is to maintain balance among NASA’s
activities.  The recommended budget structure is shown in Table 3.
The committee shifted some programs from one account to another.  As
explained in the report (H.Rept. 109-173), the new Science, Aeronautics and
Education account would include all the programs in the current Science,
Aeronautics and Education lines proposed in the request, except that the Robotic
Lunar Exploration program would be transferred from Science to Exploration
Systems.  The Exploration Systems account would include all programs currently in
the Exploration Systems line in the FY2006 request, as well as the Robotic Lunar
Exploration Program, and two activities transferred from the Space Operations
account — Space and Flight Support, and ISS Crew/Cargo Services.  The new  Space
Operations account would include only the space shuttle and the International Space
Station (minus the ISS Crew/Cargo Services activity).
H.R. 3070, as reported, further specified that, for FY2006, of the amount in the
Science, Aeronautics and Education account, $962 million was for aeronautics, $150
million was for a Hubble servicing mission (see below), and $24 million was for the
National Space Grant College and Fellowship program.  For FY2007, the bill as
reported from committee specified that, of the amounts in the Science, Aeronautics
and Education account, $990 million was for aeronautics, and $24 million was for
the National Space Grant College and Fellowship program.
Floor Action.  The House adopted a manager’s amendment during floor
debate on H.R. 3070 that significantly increased the authorization level for both
FY2006 and FY2007.  The new amounts are shown in Table 3.  In total, $510 was
added for FY2006, and $765 million for FY2007.   The amounts for Science,
Aeronautics and Education are unchanged from the committee-reported bill.  The
total for Exploration Systems increases by $663 million in FY2006 and by $925
million in FY2007.  The total for Space Operations (i.e., the space shuttle and the
International Space Station) was reduced by $168 million in FY2006, and by $160
million in FY2007.  The specific amounts identified in the committee-reported bill
remained unchanged, and, for FY2006, $8.9 million was specified for the Science
and Technology Scholarship Program. 
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As reported As passed
FY2006 FY2007 FY2006 FY2007
Science, Aeronautics and
Education 6,870 7,332 6,870 7,332
Exploration Systems 3,181 3,589 3,844 4,514
Space Operations 6,387 6,008 6,219 5,848
Inspector General 33 34 33 34
Total 16,471 16,962 16,966 17,727
Source:  H.R. 3070 as reported from the House Science Committee July 18, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-173)
and as passed by the House July 22.  Column totals may not add due to rounding.
Senate (S. 1281).  S. 1281 (S.Rept. 109-108), was reported from the Senate
Commerce Committee on July 26, 2005, and passed the Senate, amended, on
September 28, 2005. The bill would provide a five-year (FY2006-2010) authorization
for NASA.  
Committee Action.  As reported from committee, funding in the bill for
FY2006 and FY2007 was broken down into the three accounts used in NASA’s
request, but not further allocated to specific programs.   For FY2008-2010, only a
total for the agency was provided.  (See Table 11 at the end of this report for those
figures.)
For FY2006, $16.556 billion was recommended,  a $100 million increase above
the request.  That additional funding, in the Exploration Capabilities account, is for
implementing a section of the bill that pertains to increasing the scientific research
conducted aboard the ISS.  For FY2007, a $91 million increase was recommended:
$17.053 billion.  That additional funding similarly is in the Exploration Capabilities
account, but there is no language specifying how it should be spent. The bill contains
a number of policy provisions, and requires NASA to submit certain reports.  These
are discussed in subsequent sections of this report. 
Floor Action.  A manager’s amendment was adopted during floor
consideration of the bill.   In terms of funding changes from the committee-reported
version, the manager’s amendment specifies how much is allocated to science
programs within the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account for FY2006 and
FY2007: $5,341.2 million and $5,960.3 million, respectively.    The FY2006 amount
is the same as the amount requested in the amended (July) FY2006 budget request.
The FY2007 amount is the same as the amount projected in NASA’s initial
(February) FY2006 request.
A number of other policy-related changes were made in the manager’s
amendment and are discussed below.  Among them are modifying the language
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concerning retirement of the space shuttle, expanding on the requirement for
developing a national aeronautics policy, and requiring the Administrator to develop
a human capital strategy for the NASA workforce.  
Major NASA Issues
Should NASA Be a “Single Mission” Agency Implementing
the Vision for Space Exploration?
On January 14, 2004, President Bush made a major space policy address in
which he directed NASA to focus its activities on returning astronauts to the Moon
by 2020, and someday sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.”  Officially this
policy is called the “Vision for Space Exploration,” VSE, or simply “the Vision,” but
it often is informally referred to as the “Moon/Mars program.” See CRS Report
RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the “Vision for Space
Exploration”, by Marcia S. Smith, for more detail.
The President’s Vision for Space Exploration.  Under the Vision as
delineated by the President, NASA would terminate the shuttle program in 2010
when construction of the International Space Station (ISS) is expected to be
completed, instead of operating the shuttle until 2015 or beyond as planned prior to
the Columbia tragedy. The scientific research program aboard the ISS would be
restructured to support only research associated with achieving the Vision instead of
the broadly-based program that was planned. NASA would end its use of ISS by
FY2017 instead of using it for at least 10 years after assembly is completed, as
previously planned.  President Bush directed NASA to build a Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV), with a demonstration flight by 2008, and an operational capability
to low Earth orbit no later than 2014.  Its primary purpose is transporting astronauts
to and from the Moon.  NASA also would build robotic probes as “trailblazers” for
the astronauts, and launch other robotic missions to explore the solar system and the
universe, including new space telescopes.  The President invited other countries to
join in the initiative. 
The President did not propose adding significant sums to NASA’s budget to pay
for the Vision.  Instead, most of the funding was to be redirected from NASA’s other
activities.  The White House announced that $12.6 billion would be made available
for the Vision from FY2005-2009, but only $1 billion of that was new money.  The
remaining $11.6 billion would come from other NASA activities.  Taking most of the
requisite funds from other NASA programs instead of adding new money for the
agency could mitigate concerns that the Vision might increase the deficit or detract
from other national priorities.  But it raised issues about the impact on those other
NASA programs, and whether the level of funding is adequate to achieve the goals.
NASA released a “sand chart” of projected NASA budgets through 2020 (see
Figure 4).   The sand chart shows a NASA budget increasing approximately 5% each
year for FY2005-2007, less than 1% in FY2008 and 2009, and remaining roughly
level with inflation (approximately 2%) beyond FY2009.  The total amount of
funding for the Vision represented in the chart appears to be $150-$170 billion. 
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Figure 4. NASA’s “Sand Chart” of Projected Budget Authority: January 2004
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9 The transcript of the press conference is available at
[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/133896main_133896main_ESAS_rollout_press.pdf]
NASA officials said the intent of the chart was to demonstrate there was no
“balloon” in funding past FY2009, the end of the time period covered by the out-year
projections accompanying the FY2005 budget request.  However, it fueled concerns
that, inter alia, certain programs would pay the price for funding the Vision. In
addition to showing termination of the space shuttle and International Space Station
programs, it included a category labeled  “Aeronautics and Other Science Activities”
for which funding would remain essentially level, without adjustments for inflation,
throughout the 17 year time period.   That sparked concern that NASA was becoming
a “single mission” agency devoted to Vision, while sacrificing its other
responsibilities.  The FY2005 and FY2006 NASA budget requests, and their out-year
projections, further increased worry that aeronautics and certain science disciplines
would suffer in order for NASA to be able to afford the Vision, particularly when the
President’s FY2006 request for NASA was only half of what had been projected.  
The FY2005 budget and the original FY2006 budget request were prepared
under the leadership of then-NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe.   He left NASA in
February 2005, and was succeeded by Dr. Michael Griffin in April 2005.  Dr.
Griffin’s approach to implementing the Vision is different from Mr. O’Keefe’s.   Dr.
Griffin submitted changes to the FY2005 budget in the operating plan updates
discussed earlier, and to the FY2006 budget request in a July 2005 budget
amendment.   For completeness, both the original FY2006 request developed by Mr.
O’Keefe, and the amended request submitted by Dr. Griffin, are discussed below.
Under Dr. Griffin’s leadership, a sand chart equivalent to the one produced in
February 2004, showing how funding will be allocated across the agency through
2020, has not been made public.
How Much Will it Cost?  The sand chart is a budget projection, not a cost
estimate.  The White House and NASA have not released a cost estimate for
accomplishing the Vision in its entirety (such as for sending people to Mars).  The
only specific milestone for which a cost estimate has been released is for returning
humans to the Moon. 
In late February 2004, NASA estimated that landing a crew on the Moon in
2020 would cost $64 billion (in FY2003 dollars).  It consisted of $24 billion
(FY2004-2020) to build and operate the Crew Exploration Vehicle; and $40 billion
(FY2011-2020) to build the lunar lander portion of that vehicle, a new launch
vehicle, and operations.  The estimate did not include the cost of robotic missions.
In September 2005, Dr. Griffin announced the results of the Exploration
Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) — the implementation plan for the Vision.
During a September 19 press conference, he stated that it would cost $104 billion to
return humans to the Moon by 2018.9   NASA briefing charts in October 2005,
however, clarified that the $104 billion does not include the costs of CEV  missions
to the International Space Station during the 2012-2016 time period.  Those costs add
another $20 billion according to NASA, for a total estimate of $124 billion for the
first human return to the Moon.  Both figures ($104 billion and $124 billion) are
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10 Quoted in: Jeffrey F. Bell. “The Bush Space Initiative: Fiscal Nightmare or...Fiscal
Nightmare?,” SpaceDaily, March 17, 2004.
11 Transcript of remarks by Dr. Griffin, “NASA Update on NASA TV,” September 8, 2005,
[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/127082main_090805_mg_update.pdf].
adjusted for expected inflation; in calendar year 2005 dollars, the estimates are $83
billion and $99October 25, 2005 billion, respectively, according to NASA.   Dr.
Griffin stated at the press conference that, when adjusted for inflation, the cost of the
new program is 55% the cost of Apollo.  (That estimate also did not include the cost
of CEV missions to the space station.)
One question is whether NASA’s annual budget is sufficient to support
implementation of that plan.  As noted, NASA’s request for FY2006 is less than what
the White House projected last year, so the Vision did not survive even its first year
of priority setting within the total national budget.  Some critics assert that the Vision
is more about ending NASA programs than setting the nation on a bold path towards
the future.  Veteran space commentator John Pike, who operates the
globalsecurity.org website, called the Vision “a roadmap for the quiet and orderly
phase-out of manned space flight.”10
Workforce Impacts.  Another aspect of the Vision is its effect on NASA’s
workforce.  NASA’s FY2006 budget justification, which includes projections
through 2010, assumes that the agency will cut about 2,500 civil service jobs by the
end of FY2006.  The agency is offering buy-outs and other incentives to encourage
staff in certain disciplines to leave, but to date these efforts have not achieved their
targets.  NASA officials explain that everyone who currently is employed by NASA
is funded through the end of FY2006. 
As discussed below (see What is the Future of the Aeronautics Program?),
many of the personnel cuts are expected in the aeronautics field, where significant
funding cutbacks are being proposed because aeronautics is not considered to be a
Vision-related activity.  Four of NASA’s field centers focus primarily on aeronautics
research — Langley, Glenn, Ames, and Dryden — and are expected to bear the brunt
of the personnel cuts.  Dr. Griffin has been visiting each NASA center, reassuring
workers that the centers themselves will not be closed, but cautioning that workforce
changes are inevitable as NASA shifts its focus.  During a September 8, 2005 talk to
NASA employees, Dr. Griffin noted that “I can’t kid folks.  We are going to do
everything we can to assign real and meaningful work as part of the Exploration
effort into centers where that work is needed to begun [sic], but we are not going to
get all the way there. ... [T]here will be folks who are simply no longer needed at
NASA.”11  He stressed that NASA headquarters staff requirements would be
scrutinized along with those at the centers.
FY2005 Budget.  For FY2005, Congress appropriated a total for NASA that
was quite close to its requested amount:  $16.196 billion (including the FY2005
hurricane supplemental and adjusted for the across-the-board rescission) versus the
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12 For action on NASA’s FY2005 budget request, see CRS Report RL32676, The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s FY2005 Budget Request: Description, Analysis,
and Issues for Congress, by Marcia S. Smith and Daniel Morgan.
13 For example, see “Tax Record Spat Slows Omnibus Spending Vote in Senate,” Congress
Daily PM, November 20, 2004, (Special Edition).
$16.244 billion requested.12  Representative DeLay is widely credited with winning
that funding level for NASA.13  Many commentators concluded the funding level was
a sign of congressional support for the Vision.  However, conferees on the
Consolidated Appropriations Act explicitly stated that although they were
appropriating substantial funds for the Vision, “to date there has been no substantive
Congressional action endorsing this initiative.” (H.Rept. 108-792, p. 1599). They
called on the House and Senate authorizing committees to provide guidance and
authorization for the effort.   NASA’s FY2005 operating plans show how NASA
plans to spend the FY2005 funds.  The Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
in December 2004, was significantly modified in the May 10 and September 30
revisions, reflecting the different approach being taken by Dr. Griffin (discussed
elsewhere in this report).
Original FY2006 Budget Request (Under Mr. O’Keefe’s Tenure).  The
original NASA FY2006 budget request was developed under then-NASA
Administrator Sean O’Keefe.  Mr. O’Keefe’s approach to implementing the Vision
centered on development of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), with a
competition between two contractors from 2006 to 2008, at which time a final design
and single contractor would be selected.  An operational vehicle with Earth-orbital
capability would be available by 2014.   A small amount of funding was included to
begin planning for a launch vehicle for the CEV, but no decision was made on what
launch vehicle would be used.  Mr. O’Keefe would not commit to using the CEV to
service the International Space Station, seeking to keep the program focused on lunar
transportation.  Funding for Project Prometheus (to develop advanced space nuclear
power and propulsion systems, a strong interest of Mr. O’Keefe), and for the first of
a series of robotic lunar probes to support the Vision (to be launched in 2008 as
directed by the President), were relatively well supported.  In concert with the idea
that most of the funding for the Vision would come from other NASA activities, the
original FY2006 request included steep cuts in aeronautics (see below), a $1 billion
reduction in funding for space and earth sciences over the FY2006-2010 time period,
and a sharply declining budget for the space shuttle program in the FY2008-2010
time frame.  As noted above, the budget request also assumed that NASA would
reduce its civil service workforce by about 2,500 jobs by the end of FY2006.
Within NASA’s total budget request, what constitutes funding for the “Vision”
is open to interpretation.  The entire FY2006 NASA budget is labeled “Exploration
Vision,” but a FY2006 NASA budget chart (reproduced as Table 4) divides the
request into three categories:  “exploration-specific,” “shuttle & space station,” and
“earth science, aero,  & other.”  Some may consider funding for the Vision as that
contained in the “exploration-specific” category.  Others may add funding for the
space shuttle and space station, since those are often described as the first steps in the
Vision. Alternatively, funding specifically for the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD, see Table 2) could be defined as funding for the Vision.
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Table 4.  Breakdown of NASA’s FY2004-FY2010 Budget As Exploration-Specific, Shuttle and Station, and Other
($ in billions, from NASA’s original FY2006 budget request)
FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Robotic Exploration 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.8     3.9 3.9
 — Solar System Exploration 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.0 3.1
 — The Universe (Origins-Related)* 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8
Human Exploration 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.5
 — Constellation Systems 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.5
Exploration Technology 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7
 — Exploration Systems Research & Technology 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
 — Human Systems Research & Technology 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
 — Prometheus Nuclear Science & Technology 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8
Subtotal:  Exploration-Specific 5.3 5.5 6.0 7.0 7.6 8.4 9.0
Space Shuttle 4.1 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.9 2.8 2.4
International Space Station 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7
ISS Cargo & Crew 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7
Subtotal:  Shuttle & Station 5.4 6.3 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.0 4.8
CRS-24
FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Aeronautics 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Earth Sun Systems** 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.3
The Universe (SEU-Related)* 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Education 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Space and Flight Support 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Inspector General 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Subtotal:  Earth Science, Aero & others 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.2
Total 15.4 16.2 16.5 16.9 17.3 17.7 18.0
Source:  NASA table, entitled “Budget for Exploration Vision,” provided in a February 10, 2005 briefing on NASA’s original FY2006 budget request.  FY2004 is actual; FY2005
is from the December 23, 2004 Initial Operating Plan; FY2006 is the level requested in NASA’s original FY2006 budget submission; FY2007-2010 are projections.  “Total” was added
by CRS.  The NASA table did not provide an explanation for why Inspector General funding is listed as zero each year.  Typically it is $30-$35 million per year.
*Notes on the NASA table explain that the category “Universe (Origins-related)” includes Navigator (a suite of programs including the Space Interferometry Mission and the Terrestrial
Planet Finder), Webb Space Telescope, Hubble Space Telescope, the airplane-based SOFIA program (Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy), and Discovery programs.
“Universe (SEU-related)” includes GLAST (Gamma Ray Large Area Telescope), the Explorer series, ISSC (International Space Science Collaboration), Beyond Einstein, and
Universe research.  SEU means Structure and Evolution of the Universe, one of the Science themes previously identified in the space science area.  For information on these
programs, see [http://science.hq.nasa.gov/missions/index.html].
** Earth Sun Systems includes the former Earth Science program, and the former Sun-Earth Systems program (including solar-terrestrial physics projects such as Living with a Star).
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14 Dr. Michael Griffin, testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee, April 12, 2005. Transcript by Federal Document Clearing House (via Factiva).
Amended FY2006 Budget Request (Under Dr. Griffin’s Tenure).  Dr.
Griffin emphasizes that he believes NASA should continue to have a diverse set of
missions, and funding for the Vision should not come from NASA’s space science,
earth science, or aeronautics programs.  At his April 2005 confirmation hearing, he
testified that NASA pursued a broad range of activities during the Apollo program
in the 1960s and early 1970s, and sees no reason the agency cannot do so while
implementing the Vision.14  (Appendix B provides a summary comparison of
NASA’s human space flight, robotic space flight, and aeronautics activities by
decade.)  He concluded that the total amount of NASA funding is not the problem,
pointing out that NASA received approximately the same amount of money in its
first 16 years as it has in the past 16 years (adjusted for inflation).  Instead, he said,
it is a matter of setting priorities.  Dr. Griffin’s chief priorities are returning the
shuttle to flight and making each flight as safe as possible, completing construction
of the space station by 2010, terminating the shuttle in 2010, and accelerating the
development of the CEV to minimize the gap between when the shuttle ends and the
CEV is available. The following is a list of the major changes Dr. Griffin is pursuing
compared with Mr. O’Keefe’s plan.
Constellation Systems.    This program comprises the Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV) and a Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) for it, and has become the major
focus of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD).   Dr. Griffin has
stated repeatedly that he wants to close the gap between when the space shuttle will
be terminated (2010) and when the CEV becomes available.  His current goal is
2012.  He also has added servicing the International Space Station to the CEV’s
requirements.  Instead of looking for new concepts for the CEV — which might be
expensive and take time to develop — Dr. Griffin emphasizes that it should be
simple and straightforward, and therefore not require significant development time.
He has decided that instead of funding two contractors with competing designs
through 2008 as originally planned, the agency will choose a single contractor in
2006.  Dr. Griffin estimates that “downselecting” to one contractor that early could
save $1 billion.  In the near term, however, additional funds are needed both for the
CEV and the CLV.  In the September 2005 implementation plan, Dr. Griffin
announced that the CLV would be a shuttle-derived vehicle.  Another shuttle-derived
launch vehicle will be developed later for taking heavy cargo into space.  Funding for
that vehicle is not included in the FY2006 budget request.   (Shuttle-derived launch
vehicles are discussed below.)  The FY2006 budget amendment shifts $292 million
in FY2006 from other ESMD activities into the CEV/CLV. The September 30, 2005
operating plan update identifies an additional $493 million in FY2006 funds to be
shifted into CEV/CLV from research and technology programs within ESMD.  Taken
together, that would increase planned funding for CEV/CLV in FY2006 by $785
million —  from $1.12 billion in the original FY2006 request, to $1.9 billion.  (Some
question whether that much can actually be spent in FY2006, especially considering
that NASA does not plan to award a CEV contract until spring 2006.)
Project Prometheus.   This program to develop new space nuclear power
and propulsion systems was initiated by NASA prior to the Vision speech.   NASA
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initially requested $320 million for FY2006, but the July 15 budget amendment
reduced that request by $140 million, with that amount instead shifted into the
CEV/CLV effort.  The goals of Project Prometheus also are changing.  During Mr.
O’Keefe’s tenure, its goal was developing Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) and
advanced Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs).  A robotic probe, the
Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), which was being designed to study three of
Jupiter’s moons, was to be the first mission to use these new systems.   RTGs have
been used by NASA since the 1960s to supply power for spacecraft systems and
experiments on probes that travel so far from the Sun that solar energy-based systems
are impractical.  RTGs also can be used for spacecraft that land on surfaces where
they will experience “night” for long periods.  NASA has not used nuclear
propulsion, either NEP or a different type, Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP), in the
past, although NASA worked on developing NTP in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Initially, Dr. Griffin changed the focus of Project Prometheus to nuclear “surface
power” systems (for use on the lunar surface, e.g.), and NTP, with development of
NEP third on the priority list;  JIMO was indefinitely deferred.  In NASA’s
September 30, 2005 operating plan update, however, further cuts to Prometheus were
announced, and JIMO was canceled. NASA shifted Prometheus and its remaining
$270 million in FY2005 funds from ESMD back to the Science Mission Directorate
(SMD) from whence it had come.  Management of the program remains with ESMD,
however.   The operating plan noted that the program was being restructured again
because nuclear surface power is not a near-term requirement, and the resulting $76
million in “savings” would be applied to the CEV/CLV program.
Biological and Physical Research.  This activity includes research
conducted aboard the International Space Station (ISS) and was previously funded
by the Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR).  OBPR  was merged with
the Office of Exploration Systems to form the ESMD in August 2004.  Activities that
were conducted under OBPR are now funded in the “Human Systems Research and
Technology” line in ESMD’s budget.  Following the Vision speech and President
Bush’s directive that research on the ISS be restricted only to that which supports the
Vision,  NASA began developing a revised research plan, including identification of
what must be done on the ISS versus using ground-based facilities.  The details have
not been publicly released, and Dr. Griffin’s announcement that he will tap these
research funds to help pay for accelerating the CEV is further affecting that plan.
The FY2005 operating plan updates do not have a budget line item called Human
Systems R&T; it first appears in the FY2006 request. However, the FY2005
operating plan updates show that activities funded under OBPR in FY2005 were cut
by $106 million (leaving $925 million).  For FY2006, the original request was $807
million.  The July 15 budget amendment shifts $30 million of that into the CEV/CLV
effort.  The September 30, 2005 operating plan states that 34 contracts and activities
previously planned for FY2006 under Human Systems Research and Technology
would be discontinued, resulting in a net savings (after termination costs and
buyouts) of  $243 million.  It further states that 80 tasks and activities under
Exploration Systems Research and Technology will be discontinued, for a net savings
in FY2006 of $174 million.  Together, these $417 million in cuts to research and
technology would be shifted to the CEV/CLV effort.  (Added to the $76 million that
would be cut from Project Prometheus, the total addition to the FY2006 CEV/CLV
effort is $493 million, as noted above.)
CRS-27
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).  The LRO is the first of several
planned robotic missions to the Moon in support of the Vision.  The LRO’s purpose
is to support the Vision by providing detailed maps of the lunar surface, and because
the former Office of Space Science was experienced in developing such probes, it
was given management responsibility for LRO originally.  Conferees on the FY2005
appropriations bill directed that, because it was being funded by the Office of Space
Science, at least 25% of its experiments should focus on science objectives, rather
than those associated with the Vision.  In the May 10 operating plan update, Dr.
Griffin moved the program into ESMD, presumably to make its purpose and focus
clearer. The FY2005 funding level will not change from the $53 million in the
December operating plan.  (Congress cut funding for the LRO from $70 million to
$10 million in FY2005, but NASA nevertheless plans to spend $70 million on it —
$17 million that was reprogrammed in FY2004, and $53 million in FY2005).  The
July 15 budget amendment similarly moves the $135 million requested for the Lunar
Robotic Exploration Program in FY2006 from the Science Mission Directorate into
ESMD.
Congressional Action.   In the final version of the appropriations bill (H.R.
2862), Congress cut $25 million from each of the research and technology accounts
associated with the Vision (as had been approved in the House version of the bill),
$34 million from Centennial Challenges program (as in the Senate version of the
bill), and $200 million from Prometheus.  Congress added $5 million for a “heavy
lift” launch vehile..
Regarding debate over a NASA authorization bill, funding for specific programs
is not identified in the Senate version (S. 1281).  The House version (H.R. 3070)
would create a separate budget account for Exploration Systems within NASA’s
budget structure.  The amount recommended for FY2006 is $3.181 billion, $16
million more than NASA requested for Exploration Systems.  For FY2007, the
committee recommended $3.589 billion, $118 million more than projected in the
FY2006 NASA budget documents for Exploration Systems.    Because  the programs
that comprise “Exploration Systems” in the House bill are different from NASA’s
request, direct comparisons cannot be made.
The House-passed authorization bill also prohibits NASA from implementing
any Reductions in Force (RIFs) or other involuntary separations (other than for cause)
before February 16, 2007.  It further prohibits buyouts until 60 days after NASA
transmits to Congress a human capital strategy specified in the bill.  What impact
these restrictions would have on NASA’s budget is unclear.  (The House
substantially increased the authorized funding level for NASA both for FY2006 and
FY2007 as shown in Table 3.)  The Senate-passed authorization bill requires NASA
to develop a human capital strategy to ensure it has a workforce of the appropriate
size and skill mix to implement NASA’s programs.  It prohibits NASA from
initiating buyouts after the date of enactment of the act until 60 days after the human
capital strategy is submitted to Congress.  The bill also prohibits NASA from
implementing any RIFs or other involuntary separations (except for cause) before
June 1, 2007, with exceptions specified in the bill.
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What is the Space Shuttle’s Future?
The congressional committees that oversee NASA are closely following the
agency’s efforts to return the space shuttle to flight status following the February 1,
2003 Columbia tragedy.  Although NASA launched the first of two “Return to
Flight” missions — STS-114 (Discovery) — on July 26, 2005, the agency re-
grounded the shuttle fleet the next day after discovering that larger-than-expected
pieces of foam detached from the External Tank  during launch — similar to what
led to the loss of Columbia.   The Columbia tragedy, STS-114, and the Return to
Flight effort are discussed in CRS Report RS21408, NASA’s Space Shuttle Program:
The Columbia Tragedy, the Discovery Mission, and the Future of the Shuttle, by
Marcia S. Smith.  NASA is trying to determine why large pieces of foam detach from
the External Tank and how to mitigate the problem.  The date for the next shuttle
launch is uncertain.
 At the same time, there is considerable debate about the shuttle’s future in light
of President Bush’s directive that the shuttle — in its current form — be terminated
in 2010.  Some want the shuttle terminated as soon as possible, either because they
consider it unsafe or because they want to use the money now devoted to the shuttle
program for other aspects of the Vision instead.  Others want to keep the shuttle until
the CEV is operational so that the United States is not dependent on Russia for
human access to space.  Another option is to define precisely how many more shuttle
missions are needed, and operate the system until they are completed, whenever that
occurs.  A fourth alternative, articulated by Dr. Griffin after the STS-114 mission, is
to launch each shuttle mission only when NASA determines it is ready to fly instead
of trying to meet a pre-determined schedule.  Taking this one-launch-at-a-time
approach, NASA would see how many launches could be completed before 2010,
and continue construction of the ISS after that, if possible, using other launch
vehicles.  
Terminating the Shuttle in 2010.  NASA’s current “target” is to launch 18
shuttle missions in support of the ISS program, plus one possible additional mission
to service the Hubble Space Telescope, by the end of 2010.  (NASA will not make
a final decision about the Hubble servicing mission until after the shuttle completes
the second Return to Flight mission.)  Most of the remaining segments of the ISS
awaiting launch were designed to be launched only on the shuttle.  The shuttle also
is used to take crews back and forth.  Construction of ISS has been suspended since
the Columbia accident.  NASA and its ISS partners have been keeping two-man
crews aboard ISS using Russian spacecraft in the interim.
Before the STS-114 launch, NASA was assessing how many shuttle flights
would be needed to complete the ISS.  In early 2005, the estimate was 28, but Dr.
Griffin considered only 18 of those to be needed for ISS assembly.  The other 10
comprise five for logistics (taking food, water, equipment, etc. to the ISS) and five
for utilization (conducting research).  He proposed shifting the logistics flights to
other launch vehicles, that perhaps could be provided by commercial launch service
providers, and to delay NASA’s utilization of the ISS.  As noted above, the current
plan is for 18 ISS-related shuttle  missions.
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 NASA’s FY2006 request included budget projections that showed the shuttle
budget decreasing significantly beginning in FY2008 (see Table 5).  Many were
skeptical that NASA could succeed in reducing shuttle budgets while maintaining
whatever flight rate is needed.  The board that investigated the Columbia tragedy
cited budget constraints as a factor. 
Table 5. Space Shuttle Projected Funding:  FY2005-FY2010
($ in millions)
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
4,543.0 4,530.6 4,172.4 3,865.7 2,815.1 2,319.2
Source: NASA FY2006 budget justification.  The FY2005 estimate is from NASA’s December 23,
2004 Initial Operating Plan.  See the FY2005 Budget subsection below for additional changes since
then.
During testimony before the House Science Committee on November 3, 2005,
Dr. Griffin acknowledged that the shuttle program will need $3-5 billion more in
FY2008-2010 than shown in the above projection.   He is hoping to keep the figure
to a minimum through synergies he expects to achieve by melding the current shuttle
program with the effort to develop shuttle-derived launch vehicles (see below).
Another factor cited by the Columbia investigation board was schedule pressure
resulting from the ISS assembly schedule.  At the time, then-NASA Administrator
Sean O’Keefe had set completing a particular phase of ISS construction (called “U.S.
Core Complete”) by February 2004 as a priority.  Today, some worry that setting a
firm date of 2010 for completing all shuttle launches is creating an environment
similar to that prior to Columbia.  
The Senate authorization bill, S. 1281, as reported from the Senate Commerce
Committee, directed NASA not to retire the shuttle until a replacement human-rated
spacecraft has been demonstrated.  That provision was modified in the manager’s
amendment adopted by the Senate during floor consideration on September 28, 2005.
As passed by the Senate, the bill now states that it is U.S. policy to possess the
capability for assured human access to space, and directs the NASA Administrator
to act to ensure that capability and to make several related reports to Congress in
future years.  The House version, H.R. 3070, as introduced and approved at the
subcommittee level, directed that the shuttle not be launched after December 31,
2010.  However, the Democratic alternative, H.R. 3250, contained language similar
to that in the Senate bill as reported from committee.  The compromise version of
H.R. 3070, as reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept. 109-173) and
passed by the House, is silent on this issue.
“Shuttle-Derived” Launch Vehicles.  President Bush’s directive that “the
shuttle” be terminated in 2010 refers to the shuttle in its current form — a vehicle
that takes both crews and cargo into space.  The concept of developing a “shuttle-
derived” launch vehicle (SDLV, or SDV) has been discussed for many years.   The
need for a launch vehicle for the new CEV, and a “heavy lift” launch vehicle to
support other aspects of the Vision, reenergized debate about the SDLV. 
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15 These two launch vehicles were developed under the Department of Defense’s Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle program and thus are sometimes referred to as “the EELVs.”
Dr. Griffin is a strong advocate of such a vehicle, and on September 19, 2005,
announced that he had chosen that approach for implementing the Vision.  According
to that plan, two SDLVs will be developed:  one for crew (the Crew Launch Vehicle),
and one for cargo (the “heavy-lift” launch vehicle).
The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), or “single stick,” would use one Solid Rocket
Booster (the shuttle uses two, one on each side of the orbiter), augmented by a new
“upper stage,” with the CEV on top.  The heavy lift version would modify the
External Tank (the large cylindrical tank that carries fuel for the orbiter’s main
engines), add SRBs, with a cargo-carrying spacecraft on top. It would be designed to
lift approximately 125 tons of cargo to low Earth orbit (LEO), several times more
than what could be launched with existing versions of the other two major U.S.
launch vehicles — Atlas V and Delta IV.15
Building a SDLV could mitigate some of the workforce displacements that
would result from  terminating the shuttle program in its current form.  It also could
bring a new launch vehicle into the U.S. fleet at lower cost than developing a new
vehicle from scratch.  But proponents of the Atlas and Delta argue that if NASA used
them for the Vision, the cost per launch would go down, making space launches more
affordable for DOD and NASA overall.  The Atlas and Delta also might be able to
be modified to launch heavier payloads.    
Dr. Griffin and Dr. Ronald Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force, signed a
letter to the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
on August 5, 2005, agreeing that NASA will develop the two SDLVs described
above (one for crew, one for cargo).  Dr. Sega, a former NASA astronaut, is the
Department of Defense’s  Executive Agent for Space.   In return, NASA agreed that
it would use the Atlas V and Delta IV to launch all of its other spacecraft in the 5-20
metric ton range, including ISS cargo re-supply missions (although new
commercially-developed launch vehicles may compete with the Atlas V and Delta
IV if they become available). 
Boeing manufactures the Delta IV.  Lockheed Martin manufactures the Atlas V,
as well as the External Tanks for the space shuttle system.  The SRBs are
manufactured by ATK Thiokol.  The United Space Alliance, a 50-50 joint venture
between Boeing and Lockheed Martin, is the “single prime contractor” in charge of
most ground operations for the existing space shuttle system.  Boeing and Lockheed
Martin have announced plans to create a similar joint venture, called United Launch
Alliance, to market Atlas V and Delta IV to government customers.  (Another launch
vehicle company, SpaceX, has filed an antitrust suit to prevent the joint venture.)
FY2005 Budget.  For FY2005, NASA  requested $4.3 billion for the space
shuttle program, compared with $4 billion in FY2004.  NASA informed Congress
in November 2004 that it needed $762 million more in FY2005 for the shuttle
program, but a budget amendment was not submitted.  Congress appropriated the
requested amount, and said that NASA could reprogram funds, or submit a
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supplemental request if needed.  According to NASA briefing charts accompanying
its May 10, 2005 operating plan update, funding was reprogrammed as follows: $55
million from the Science Mission Directorate ($20 million from space science, $35
million from earth science); $375.8 million from the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate ($73 million from biological and physical research, $204 million from
human and robotic technology, and $98 million from transportation systems); and
$331.2 million from the Space Operations Mission Directorate ($160 million from
the space station, $170 million from space shuttle upgrades, and $1.2 million from
space flight support). 
FY2006 Budget Request and Congressional Action.   NASA’s FY2006
request for the shuttle program was $4.5 billion.   The final version of the FY2006
Science, State, Justice, and Commerce appropriations bill (H.R. 2862) funds the
shuttle at the requested level.  The extent to which the continuing efforts to reduce
foam loss from the External Tank in the wake of the Discovery launch, and the
effects of Hurricane Katrina on Stennis Space Center and the Michoud Assembly
Facility (described earlier) may require an augmentation for the shuttle budget, is not
clear.  The authorization bills do not specify how much funding is provided for the
shuttle. 
What Should Be the U.S. Strategy for the International Space
Station Program?
NASA began what is now known as the International Space Station (ISS)
program in 1984.  Canada, Japan, 10 European countries, and Russia are partners
with the United States in building the space station.   For more information, see CRS
Issue Brief IB93017, Space Stations, by Marcia S. Smith.
Assembly of the space station was originally intended to be completed by 1994,
followed by 30 years of operation during which a wide variety of scientific research
would be conducted.  The results of that research were expected to have applications
on Earth such as new and better pharmaceuticals,  metal alloys, and manufacturing
processes.  The original cost estimate was $8 billion (in FY1984 dollars).
Twenty-one years and approximately $35 billion later, whether those promises
will be met is uncertain.  Under the Vision, NASA is directed to meet its
commitments to the other partners, finish construction in 2010, and complete its
utilization of the ISS by FY2017.  (The other partners could continue to use it beyond
that time.)  The President directed that the only research conducted by NASA is that
needed to implement the Vision, not the broadly-based program that was planned. 
Until November 2005, NASA was facing questions about how NASA astronauts
would be able to access the ISS after April 2006 because the Iran Nonproliferation
Act (INS) prohibited NASA from paying Russia for ISS-related goods and services
unless the President made a determination that Russia was not proliferation certain
technologies to Iran.  The linkage between the ISS and the INA, its implications for
the future of U.S. access to ISS, and congressional action, are explained in CRS
Report RS22072, The Iran Nonproliferation Act and the International Space Station:
Issues and Options, by Sharon Squassoni and Marcia S. Smith; and CRS Report
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RS22270, The International Space Station and the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA):
The Bush Administration’s Proposed INA Amendment, by Marcia S. Smith and
Sharon Squassoni.   On November 8, 2005, however, the Senate passed an amended
version of S. 1713, which would permit NASA to purchase needed goods and
services from Russia through January 1, 2012.  Thus, this issue seems to be resolved
for the moment.
NASA spends about $2 billion a year on ISS, in addition to the costs of the
shuttle program. Some question whether ISS is worth that level of investment
considering the modest research opportunities that remain. Others consider fulfilling
U.S. commitments to the other ISS partners to be a sufficient rationale for continued
U.S. involvement.  President Bush pledged to fulfill U.S. commitment to the ISS
partners in his Vision speech.  Dr. Griffin has reiterated that pledge.  How NASA
will do that is unclear, since the partners anticipated that the space shuttle, with its
large crew and cargo capacity, would be available during the operational phase of the
ISS.   NASA also was committed to building a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV)  that
would enable the crew size to increase to at least six.  NASA canceled the CRV, then
replaced it with another program (called an Orbital Space Plane), which then also
was canceled.  Dr. Griffin now plans to develop a CEV that can be used not only to
take crews to and from the Moon, but as a vehicle to transport crews to and from ISS,
and remain docked to the ISS for long periods of time, enabling it to serve in a CRV-
mode.  Thus, the United States once again is planning to build a vehicle to fulfill the
CRV function, but the termination of the shuttle would still significantly reduce the
ability of the ISS partners to take cargo to and from the ISS. 
Another question is what will happen to the ISS once NASA discontinues its use
of the facility.  Would it be turned over to the other partners?  Would it be
privatized?  Would it be deorbited?  If it remains in orbit under someone else’s
control, would the United States have any continuing liability if, for example, it made
an uncontrolled reentry and impacted people or property on the ground?  Or if it
collided with another object in space?
FY2005 Budget.  Congress did not specify a funding level for the ISS in the
FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act.  The request was $2.412 billion:  $1.863
billion for construction and operations, including $140 million in a new “ISS
Crew/Cargo Services” line to pay for alternatives to the shuttle for taking crew and
cargo to and from ISS; and $549 million for research (included in the request for the
Office of Biological and Physical Research).  NASA’s December 23, 2004 Initial
Operating Plan cut $160 million from ISS construction and operations to help pay for
additional costs for returning the space shuttle to flight status.   Funding for research
also was cut, from the planned $549 million to $382 million (per the December
operating plan).   FY2005 funding for ISS Crew/Cargo Services was identified as $98
million, and NASA took $85 million of that to begin paying for damages from
Hurricane Katrina.  NASA hopes to repay this account from funds made available
through an emergency supplemental appropriations request.  As noted earlier, the
reallocation request submitted to Congress on October 28, 2005 includes $324.8
million for NASA, out of a total of $760 million that the agency estimates is needed
for hurricane recovery.   How much of the $324.8 million will be used to repay the
ISS Crew/Cargo line therefore is unclear.
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FY2006 Budget Request and Congressional Action.  The original
FY2006 ISS request was $1.857 billion for construction and operations, including
$160 million for ISS Crew/Cargo Services; plus $324 million for ISS research.  Dr.
Griffin indicated in the May 10, 2005 update to the FY2005 operating plan that the
ISS Crew/Cargo Services activity and associated FY2005 funding is being moved to
the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD).  The July 15 budget
amendment similarly moves the FY2006 ISS Crew/Cargo funding into ESMD,
reducing the request for ISS construction and operations commensurately.  The
budget amendment identifies the FY2006 request for ISS Crew/Cargo Services as
$168 million, rather than $160 million as shown in earlier NASA FY2006 budget
briefing charts.  Thus the revised FY2006 request for ISS construction and operations
is $1.689 billion.
In the FY2006 SSJC appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), the House cut $10 million
from ISS construction and operations, and $10 million from ISS Crew/Cargo services
program.  The Senate cut all $160 million from ISS Crew/Cargo services because
NASA did not spend any of the $98 million provided for FY2005. (As noted above,
NASA allocated $85 million of that funding to pay for damage from Hurricane
Katrina.)  The final version of the bill cuts the ISS program by $80 million ($60
million of which is from the ISS Crew/Cargo Services line).  That would make the
final budget $1.777 billion using the original budget request ($1.857 billion minus
$80 million), or $1.669 billion under the amended budget ($1.689 billion minus $20
million).
Added to that is the funding for ISS research.  According to NASA, the amount
it plans to spend on ISS research in FY2006 has declined from $324 million to $306
million.  Added to the $1.669 billion, that would make the FY2006 ISS budget
$1.975 billion.
In its version of the NASA authorization bill (S. 1281), the Senate added $100
million for FY2006 for ISS research  That bill also includes extensive language about
enhancing the utilization of the ISS, including direction that the U.S. segment of the
ISS be established as a “national laboratory.”  The House-passed version of the
authorization bill (H.R. 3070) requires NASA to allocate 15% of the funds budgeted
for ISS research to research that is not directly related to supporting the Vision.  It
also directs the Administration to ensure that ISS can be used for a diverse range of
microgravity research, be able to support a crew size of at least six persons, support
CEV docking and automated docking of other vehicles, and be operated at an
appropriate risk level.  It also requires a report from NASA on issues such as the ISS
research agenda and how the ISS will be completed and serviced.  
The FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391) imposed a cost cap
on the ISS program (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017, Space Stations, by Marcia S.
Smith, for details).  H.R. 3070, as passed by the House, would repeal the cap.  S.
1281, as passed by the Senate, would require NASA to submit a report within six
months of enactment that explains the impacts of the space shuttle Columbia
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accident, and NASA’s shift to full cost accounting,16 on the development costs of the
ISS, and identifies any statutory changes needed to address those impacts.
Should the Hubble Space Telescope be Serviced?
NASA launched the Hubble Space Telescope in 1990.  From the beginning,
Hubble was designed to be serviced regularly by astronauts.  That design proved
fortuitous when it was discovered that Hubble had a defective mirror that produced
blurry images.  Astronauts on the first servicing mission in 1993 were able to install
corrective optics, allowing years of scientific accomplishments and generating
widespread scientific and public support.  Additional servicing missions were
conducted in 1997, 1999, and 2002 to replace aging hardware and install advanced
scientific instruments.  Two more shuttle missions to Hubble were scheduled:
another servicing mission in 2004 (known as SM-4) and a retrieval mission to bring
the telescope back to Earth in 2010.  In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, however,
then-NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe decided in January 2004 not to proceed
with either flight.  His stated reason was the safety of the shuttle astronauts, but many
critics perceived a connection with the new priorities of the Vision for Space
Exploration, announced just days before.
The decision to cancel SM-4 brought praise from some, but also considerable
congressional and public opposition.  The opposition initially focused on efforts to
reverse Mr. O’Keefe’s decision and proceed with a shuttle mission. Attention soon
shifted to robotic options, which dominated the public discussion of Hubble’s future
throughout most of 2004.  In March 2004, Mr. O’Keefe agreed to ask the National
Research Council (NRC) to study options for extending Hubble’s life, including both
shuttle and robotic missions.  In December 2004, the final NRC report surprised
many by finding it “unlikely that NASA will be able to extend the science life of
[Hubble] through robotic servicing.”  The report recommended a servicing mission
by astronauts in the space shuttle, and a robotic mission only for deorbiting the
telescope at the end of its useful lifetime.17  Hubble does not have its own propulsion
system,  and would make an uncontrolled reentry if a propulsion module is not
attached to the spacecraft.  An uncontrolled reentry would put people and property
under Hubble’s orbit at risk of damage from falling debris.  NASA initially estimated
that if Hubble were left unattended, it would make an uncontrolled reentry in about
2012.  That date has been extended to at least 2021 by additional NASA analysis that
was first reported in August 2005.
Mr. O’Keefe stood by his decision not to proceed with a shuttle servicing
mission, and by early 2005, NASA’s work on a robotic mission to Hubble was
focused on deorbiting it, rather than servicing it.  The confirmation of Michael
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Griffin as NASA Administrator in April 2005 breathed new life into efforts to service
Hubble.  At his Senate confirmation hearing on April 12, 2005, Dr. Griffin stated that
while he considered robotic servicing infeasible and “would like to take the robotic
mission off the plate,” he planned to revisit the shuttle servicing option after the
shuttle returns to flight.  After two successful shuttle flights, NASA would be able
to reassess the risks associated with what Dr. Griffin considers “essentially a new
vehicle.”  H.R. 3070 and S. 1281 both call for a shuttle servicing mission after the
shuttle returns to flight successfully “unless such a mission would compromise
astronaut safety”; they would also require a status report on servicing plans within
60 days of the landing of the second successful RTF flight.  Prospects for servicing
Hubble became more uncertain when NASA grounded the shuttle fleet again after
problems with the first RTF launch on July 26, 2005.
Congress is debating how to balance the scientific value and public popularity
of Hubble with the cost of servicing it, the likely impact of that cost on other NASA
astronomy programs, and the remaining safety risks.  The NRC report described
Hubble as “an enormous scientific success ... the most powerful space astronomical
facility ever built ... garnering sustained public attention over its entire lifetime.”
Without a servicing mission, Hubble would cease scientific operations in about 2008.
On the other hand, many expect the cost of a Hubble servicing mission, followed by
the cost of operating Hubble for an unknown number of additional years, to be offset
by reductions in other NASA astronomy programs.  The July 15 budget amendment
stated that most of the funding needed to preserve a Hubble servicing option would
come from the Terrestrial Planet Finder, a planned future astronomy spacecraft.
Considering that Hubble was originally intended to operate only until 2005, and SM-
4 was originally intended to extend operations only until 2010, some question
whether it makes scientific sense to cut funding for future missions in order to extend
the life of Hubble past 2008.  And a shuttle mission will always entail some safety
risks.
Plans for deorbiting Hubble also remain an issue.  As noted above, before the
Columbia tragedy, Hubble was to be returned to Earth by the space shuttle at the end
of its lifetime.  NASA no longer plans to do this, and since Hubble has no propulsion
system of its own, a propulsion module must be attached to the spacecraft to permit
a controlled deorbit.  Remotely attaching the required new hardware is
technologically challenging, however.  If there is a shuttle servicing mission, a
deorbit module could be attached at that time, but on August 31, 2005, NASA
terminated work on such a module.  New analysis indicates that Hubble will not
reenter the atmosphere until at least 2021, and NASA expects new capabilities to be
available by then.  Boosting Hubble’s orbit during a shuttle servicing mission could
delay the date of reentry even further, but at some point, deorbiting will be necessary
if an uncontrolled reentry is to be avoided.
Cost estimates for a Hubble servicing mission vary widely, depending partly on
what the mission would include, and partly on how one treats the costs of the shuttle
launch.  Before the Columbia tragedy, Hubble servicing missions were estimated to
cost about $100 million each, not including the marginal cost of a shuttle launch.
According to a GAO report in November 2004, NASA then estimated the full cost,
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including all shuttle costs, at between $1.7 billion and $2.4 billion; GAO considered
this estimate “not yet definitive.”18
FY2005 Budget.  The FY2005 budget was released shortly after Mr.
O’Keefe’s first announcement that the shuttle would not fly to Hubble.  At that time,
NASA intended to cancel the 2004 servicing mission entirely, and was only in the
earliest stages of studying the possibility of robotic deorbiting.  For this reason, the
potential costs of servicing and deorbiting were not included in the FY2005 request.
Most of the $130.1 million requested for Hubble was for data analysis.  The FY2005
appropriations conference agreement was written before the release of the NRC
report, at a time when the debate was focused on the robotic option.  It designated
$291 million for development of a Hubble servicing mission, but it did not specify
where NASA should make the offsetting reductions.
NASA’s initial operating plan for FY2005, released after the NRC report but
before the appointment of Administrator Griffin, reflected $175 million for
development of Hubble servicing and deorbiting missions, with the remainder of the
$291 million to be determined after a design review in March 2005. The May 2005
update to the operating plan, released after Dr. Griffin’s announcement that a shuttle
servicing mission will be reassessed after the shuttle completes its Return to Flight
missions, reflected the full $291 million. 
FY2006 Budget Request and Congressional Action.  In the original
FY2006 budget, NASA requested $190.7 million for Hubble, including funds for
development of a deorbit mission but not for a servicing mission.  The July 15 budget
amendment requested an additional $30 million to preserve the option of a Hubble
servicing mission.  The House-passed authorization bill, H.R. 3070, would authorize
$150 million in FY2006 for a Hubble servicing mission.  The Senate-passed
authorization bill, S. 1281, would not specify funding for Hubble.
The House-passed appropriations bill, H.R. 2862, did not specify a funding level
for Hubble, although report language applauded Dr. Griffin’s commitment to reassess
SM-4.  The Senate Appropriations Committee report recommended a $250 million
increase, pending the Administrator’s reassessment and final decision; a floor
amendment provided $250 million for a servicing mission as bill language in the
Senate-passed bill.  The final version of the bill provides a total of $271 million: the
original request, plus the addition requested in the July budget amendment, plus
another $50 million “to continue planning, preparation, and engineering activities”
for SM-4, “pending a final decision” to proceed.
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What is the Future of NASA’s Aeronautics Program?
Aeronautics R&D has a long history of government involvement, starting in
1915 with the creation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA).  NASA was established in 1958 using NACA as its nucleus, and NACA’s
research centers were transferred to the new agency. Although NASA is better known
for its space programs, supporters note that aeronautics is “the first A in NASA.”
For several years, however, aeronautics advocates have failed to halt a
multi-year slide in funding.  NASA’s budget for aeronautics was cut by about
one-third in the late 1990s, with the termination of programs in high-speed research
and advanced subsonic technology.  In 2003, NASA’s move to full-cost accounting
heightened funding concerns, because research facilities such as wind tunnels play
an especially large role in the aeronautics program.19  In 2004, when the President
announced the Vision for Space Exploration, many foresaw that new spending
priorities would increase the pressure on aeronautics further.  The FY2006 budget
request confirmed that expectation: according to Administrator Griffin, “the nation
makes available to us within NASA a certain amount of money ...  The fact is that in
the President’s program going forward, aeronautics is not as high a priority as ...
space exploration.”20
New Directions for Aeronautics at NASA.  The FY2006 budget request
proposed to “transform” the largest element of the aeronautics program, Vehicle
Systems.  Funding for Vehicle Systems would be reduced by 27% relative to
FY2005, there would be more emphasis on barrier-breaking demonstrations, and
resources would be focused on a smaller number of research areas.  NASA described
this new approach as a pilot for transforming the entire Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate.  The restructured program would consist of four projects:  two
on noise reduction, one on emissions reduction, and one on unpiloted research
aircraft.  The topics eliminated would include hypersonics, rotorcraft, and
ultraefficient engine technology — all of which have received congressional funding
increases in past appropriations cycles — as well as most evolutionary, incremental
improvements to subsonic aeronautics.
The proposed elimination of several entire research areas was controversial,
especially in the context of substantial, continuing reductions in total funding for the
program.  The House Appropriations Committee report on H.R. 2862 called for
NASA to continue work on hypersonics and rotorcraft and expressed the view that
transforming the aeronautics program was premature in light of a May 2005 report
by the National Institute of Aerospace and a forthcoming study by the National
Research Council (both discussed further below).  The Senate committee report on
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H.R. 2862 referred to the proposed changes in Vehicle Systems as “dismantlement”
and directed NASA to “maintain the existing program structure ... along with its
people and facilities.”   The House Science Committee report on H.R. 3070 (H.Rept.
109-173) identified civil supersonic transport, rotorcraft, and hypersonics as
initiatives that NASA “may establish.”  S. 1281 as passed by the Senate identified
supersonic transport, rotorcraft, and hypersonics as high-priority areas in which
NASA “shall, at a minimum ... conduct programs.”
In August 2005, Lisa J. Porter became Administrator Griffin’s senior adviser for
aeronautics, and on October 24, 2005, she was named associate administrator for the
Aeronautics Mission Directorate.  Dr. Porter is seen as the driving force behind yet
another “reshaping” of NASA’s plans for aeronautics, which the September operating
plan describes as “consistent with direction received from our Committees.”  The
new plans will after all include “core competencies in subsonic, supersonic, and
hypersonic flight” as well as rotorcraft.  Among other changes, the Vehicle Systems
program will be renamed Fundamental Aeronautics to reflect its new character.
Although there has been no formal amendment of the FY2006 budget request, the
new plans appear to supersede the “transformation” initially proposed.  According
to press reports, the changes also herald a “complete redirection” in FY2007 that will
include new programs in hypersonics and rotorcraft in coordination with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).21  The conference report on H.R.
2862 expressed support for the latest realignment.
Impact on NASA Workforce and Facilities.  An especially controversial
consequence of the proposed funding reductions is a reduction in staffing levels at
NASA centers.  According to NASA briefing charts, the proposed reduction in
aeronautics funding would mean the elimination of 1,100 civil service jobs at the
centers by FY2007.  A smaller number of on-site contractor positions would also be
eliminated.  Most of the affected positions would be at Langley Research Center (in
Hampton, VA) and Glenn Research Center (in Cleveland, OH), but Dryden Flight
Research Center (in Edwards, CA) and Ames Research Center (in Mountain View,
CA) would also be affected.  Some aeronautics research facilities at these centers
would likely be closed as well, but the affected facilities have not yet been identified.
Aeronautics supporters and leaders in the affected communities have expressed alarm
at the consequences of these changes, both for aeronautics itself and for the local
economies surrounding the centers.  Since taking over as NASA Administrator in
April 2005, Dr. Griffin has sought to downplay the cuts at the centers.  He and other
NASA officials insist that the goal is to transform centers, not to close them, and to
ensure that the NASA workforce has the mix of skills that is necessary to implement
the Vision.  On visits to Glenn and Langley in May 2005, Dr. Griffin stated that job
losses there will not be as severe as was earlier projected.  H.R. 3070 as passed by
the House prohibits NASA from implementing reductions in force (RIFs) or other
involuntary separations (except for cause) until February 16, 2007; this date was
October 1, 2006 in the committee-reported bill.
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Impact on U.S. Industry and Other Agencies.  If research areas such as
subsonic aeronautics and hypersonics were eliminated from NASA’s aeronautics
program, would other federal agencies, or the U.S. private sector, conduct the
research that is needed in these areas?  A leading justification for federal aeronautics
funding has been the economic importance of the U.S. aircraft industry.  Supporters
often cite increases in European funding for aeronautics R&D as a threat to U.S.
competitiveness.  The high-risk, high-payoff approach proposed in the FY2006
budget request would shift the program’s value to industry towards longer-term
needs.  Some believe that this is appropriate, and that industry should be responsible
for its own short-term R&D, but others argue that aeronautics “requires unique
national facilities and world-class researchers that are not resident in any one
company” and that “the fruits of this research add to the nation’s wealth, not just to
that of any individual company.”22  In the past NASA has also stated that it plays “a
key role in ... increasing the performance of military aircraft.”23  The FY2006 budget
documents do not mention this goal (although the September 30 update to the
FY2005 operating plan does).  The Air Force, the Navy, and DARPA have
aeronautics R&D programs, particularly in the area of hypersonics.  These Defense
Department programs tend to focus on specific military missions, such as rapid long-
range strike, so they may not address all aspects of the field.  On the other hand,
much of their work has a long enough time horizon that it can be applied quite
generally.  A concern that has not yet been resolved is how Defense Department and
industrial users of NASA aeronautics facilities, such as high-speed wind tunnels,
would be affected by possible facility closures.  H.R. 3070 as passed by the House
would call for an independent review of NASA test facilities and would prohibit
closures until completion of that review.  S. 1281 as passed by the Senate would
prohibit closures until completion of a national aeronautics policy.
A National Aeronautics Policy.  Supporters and critics alike have long
argued that NASA’s aeronautics program needs a clearer vision of its goals and
direction.  In February 2001, NASA sought to answer this criticism in The NASA
Aeronautics Blueprint: Toward a Bold New Era in Aviation.24  November 2002
brought recommendations on aeronautics from the congressionally established
Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry.25  In November
2003, the National Research Council published An Assessment of NASA’s
Aeronautics Technology Programs.26  In May 2005, the National Institute of
Aerospace released a congressionally requested five-year plan for U.S. aeronautics
research, Responding to the Call: Aviation Plan for American Leadership.27  The
National Research Council is undertaking another study, to be completed in late
2006, that will “assess and develop options for a national policy in aeronautics,”
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“develop a course of action to guide the federal government’s investment and role in
aeronautics,” and “provide specific guidance on how to disseminate whatever federal
resources may be allocated for aeronautics research.”28  Despite all these efforts, there
is still no consensus view of NASA’s role in aeronautics.
The final version of FY2006 appropriations bill (H.R. 2862) directs the
President, through the NASA Administrator and in consultation with other agencies,
to develop “a national aeronautics policy ... through 2020,” including a description
of research priorities through 2011, the process for setting priorities in subsequent
years, needs for facilities and personnel through 2011, and budget assumptions.  The
policy is to be submitted to Congress within one year of enactment.  Similar language
was in the House-passed bill, and although the provision was not in the Senate-
passed bill, the Senate committee report supported the concept.  The House and
Senate authorization bills, H.R. 3070 and S. 1281, would also direct the President to
develop a national aeronautics policy, but they differ in some details of the plan’s
required content, the issues to be considered in developing it, and the schedule for
submitting the plan to Congress.
FY2005 Budget.  Aeronautics funding in FY2005 is $962 million.  This total
consists of $630 million for the Vehicle Systems program, $183 million for Aviation
Safety and Security, and $149 million for Airspace Systems.  The original FY2005
appropriation was $919 million, reduced to $906 million by a general rescission.
NASA transferred $56 million into the program in its May 2005 operating plan,
making the total $962 million, to support the cost of congressionally directed items
that were not in the FY2005 budget request.
FY2006 Budget Request and Congressional Action.  The FY2006
request for aeronautics was $852 million, with a further reduction to $728 million
projected for FY2007.  The FY2006 total consisted of $459 million for Vehicle
Systems, $193 million for Aviation Safety and Security, and $200 million for
Airspace Systems.  The July 15 budget amendment made no changes to the FY2006
request for aeronautics.  The authorization bill passed by the House, H.R. 3070,
would authorize $962 million for FY2006 and $990 million for FY2007.  The
authorization bill passed by the Senate, S. 1281, would not specify a funding
authorization for aeronautics.
The House-passed version of the appropriations bill, H.R. 2862, provided $906
million, the same as the FY2005 appropriation before the changes made by the May
2005 operating plan.  The Senate-passed version provided $859 million (in Section
307) as the result of a floor amendment.  (The Senate-reported bill did not specify
overall funding for aeronautics, though committee report language recommended $25
million for hypersonics.)  The final version of the appropriations bill provides $912.3
million, including $25 million for hypersonics, and directs NASA to provide a plan
for how it intends to allocate aeronautics funding for FY2006.
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NASA’s FY2006 Request By Budget Account
NASA’s FY2006 budget has three accounts:  Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration (SA&E);  Exploration Capabilities; and Inspector General.  This section
follows the format of the NASA budget as shown in the agency’s FY2006 budget
estimate.  As noted, NASA has changed its budget structure repeatedly over the past
several years.  For FY2006, the names of the budget accounts remain the same as last
year.  However, the programs under the two major accounts (SA&E, and Exploration
Capabilities) have changed to reflect a new NASA headquarters organization adopted
in August 2004.  In summary, the Office of Space Science and the Office of Earth
Science merged, and are now the Science Mission Directorate (SMD).  The Office
of Biological and Physical Research and the Office of Exploration merged, and are
now the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD).  The Office of Education
was abolished.  Its activities are now under a Chief Education Officer.  The Office
of Space Flight was renamed the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD).
The Office of Aeronautics was renamed the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate (ARMD).
The SA&E account funds the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), the
Exploration Systems Mission Director (ESMD), the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate (ARMD), and Education Programs.  The Exploration Capabilities
account funds the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), which includes
the International Space Station (ISS), the space shuttle, and space flight operations.
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration (SA&E)
In the FY2006 budget, the SA&E account includes the Science Mission
Directorate, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate, and Education Programs.   The Science Mission Directorate focuses on
increasing human understanding of space and Earth, and makes use of satellites,
space probes, and robotic spacecraft to gather and transmit data.  The Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate is focused on implementing the Vision for Space
Exploration, including development of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle to take
astronauts to and from the Moon, development of nuclear power and propulsion
systems, and biological and physical research, including that to be conducted on the
ISS.  The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate contributes to increasing air
traffic capacity, reducing the impact of aircraft noise and emissions, and improving
aviation safety and security.  NASA’s education funding is for programs aimed at
educating children in elementary and secondary school, as well as university students,
in science, mathematics, engineering, and technology.
For FY2006, NASA initially requested $9.661 billion for SA&E, compared with
$9.336 billion appropriated for FY2005 (per the December 23, 2004 Initial Operating
Plan).  That request was increased to $9.829 billion in the July 15 budget
amendment, reflecting the shift of $168 million from the Exploration Capabilities
account into this account.  The $168 million is for ISS Crew/Cargo Services that had
been part of the International Space Station program.  That activity now will be part
of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.  The following tables show how
much was requested for various activities within the Mission Directorates.  The
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authorization and appropriations bills do not provide this level of detail, so
congressional action on the request cannot be summarized in these tables.  However,
the text discusses significant changes that were made to specific programs.
Science.  The Science Mission Directorate (SMD) is the merger of the former
Office of Space Science (OSS) and Office of Earth Science (OES).  Each of those
offices was organized by “themes.”  OSS had six themes (Solar System Exploration,
Mars Exploration, Lunar Exploration, Astronomical Search for Origins, Structure and
Evolution of the Universe, and Sun-Earth Connections), and OES had two (Earth
System Science, and Earth Science Applications).  All of those now have been
merged into three themes under the new SMD:  Solar System Exploration, the
Universe, and Earth-Sun System.
Solar System Exploration programs involve sending spacecraft to other planets,
the Moon, and other solar system destinations (such as asteroids).  They combine the
previous themes of Solar System Exploration, Mars Exploration, and Lunar
Exploration.  Programs in the Universe theme include space-based astronomical
observatories such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Spitzer Space Telescope, the
Chandra X-Ray Observatory, and plans for future observatories, as well as planning
for studies of dark energy and dark matter, for example.  They combine the previous
themes of Astronomical Search for Origins, and Structure and Evolution of the
Universe.  The Earth-Sun System theme studies the Earth as a system (such as global
climate change) and interactions between the Sun and the Earth (solar terrestrial
physics). This theme combines activities previously under the two OES themes, and
the Sun-Earth Connections theme that was part of OSS.









Solar System Exploration 1,858.1 1,900.5 1,667.5
The Universe 1,513.2 1,512.2 1,522.2
Earth-Sun System 2,155.2 2,063.6 2,151.9
Total 5,527.2 5,476.3 5,341.6
Source: NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on December 23, 2004.  Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the
format of the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
Budget Amendment Changes.  The July 15 FY2006 budget amendment
made the following changes to the Science Mission Directorate (SMD).   First are
several changes to the Solar System Exploration theme.  As announced in the May
10 operating plan update for FY2005, NASA decided to move the Lunar Robotic
Exploration Program into the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD)
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since its primary purpose is to support the Vision for Space Exploration.  The
FY2006 budget amendment therefore shifts the $135 million requested for the Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter to ESMD, with a consequent reduction in the Solar System
Exploration theme.  Next, the budget amendment reduces funding for this theme by
$98 million, shifting $88.3 million into the Earth-Sun System theme, and $10 million
into the Universe theme.  According to the budget amendment, the $98 million was
“made available” by cancellation or deferral of several robotic Mars exploration
programs, while funding also will be added to fund extended operation of the Mars
rovers currently on the Martian surface, and to maintain a 2009 launch date for the
Mars Science Laboratory [http://marsprogram.jpl.nasa.gov/missions/future/msl.html].
The budget amendment states that the Universe theme would be increased by
$10 million, with $30 million provided to preserve the option of a Hubble servicing
mission.  Most of the funds for the Hubble option would come from funding for a
future astronomical observatory called the Terrestrial Planet Finder
[http://planetquest.jpl.nasa.gov/TPF/tpf_index.html].
The $88.3 million added for Earth-Sun System would be allocated to the Glory
mission (see below), provide additional funding for extending the mission of
currently operating satellites, and maintain the launch schedule for the Solar
Dynamics Observatory [http://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/].
Concerns About NASA’s Earth Science Program.  The merger of space
science and earth science, and cuts to funding for earth science programs as NASA
redirects money into implementing the Vision, have raised concerns in the earth
science community and Congress.  The House Science Committee held a hearing on
NASA’s earth science program on April 28, 2005.  Among the witnesses was Dr.
Berrien Moore, the chairman of a National Research Council study that is reviewing
NASA’s earth sciences program.29  Dr. Moore warned that the process of building an
understanding of the earth system is “at risk of collapse”30 because of decisions to
terminate certain NASA earth science missions.  Science Committee Chairman
Boehlert said in his opening statement that “The planet that has to matter most to us
is the one we live on.  You’d think that would go without saying. ... It’s great if earth
science can contribute to exploration, and greater still if exploration of other planets
could teach us more about Earth.”31
NASA’s FY2006 budget justification documents did not allow a comparison of
funding for earth science programs between the FY2006 request and prior years
because funding for earth science was merged with funding for programs that had
been part of the Sun-Earth Connections theme, which was in the former Office of
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Space Science.  NASA provides five-year funding projections — called the “budget
run-out” — in its annual budget justifications that show the request for the current
year plus projections for the next four years.  In preparation for the hearing, the
Science Committee insisted that NASA provide such a comparison for earth sciences.
The funding data were published in the hearing charter (available on the committee’s
website), and are reproduced in the following table.  The data show the budget run-
out as it was projected in the FY2004 budget (for FY2004-FY2008), FY2005 budget
(for FY2005-FY2009), and the current budget (FY2006-FY2010).  The table shows
that the earth sciences budget was $1.55 billion in FY2004, $1.49 billion for the
current fiscal year (FY2005), and the request for FY2006 is $1.37 billion.  Thus, the
program experienced a significant cut in FY2005 — a $1 billion cut through the
five-year run-out compared with what had been projected in F2004.  The cut in the
FY2006 request is slightly less.  In summary, the cut from FY2004 to FY2005 is 8%;
the cut from FY2004-FY2006 is 12%.
Table 7.  Changes to Earth Science Budget Run-Out
($ in billions)
FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
2004 Request 1.55 1.53 1.6 1.7 1.73
2005 Request 1.49 1.39 1.37 1.34 1.47
2006 Request 1.37 1.35 1.33 1.47 1.44
Source:  House Science Committee. Hearing Charter for April 28, 2005 Hearing on NASA Earth
Sciences.  Available on the committee’s website [http://www.house.gov/science].
Among the earth science programs of particular concern to the earth science
community are the Global Precipitation Mission (GPM), Glory, and continuation of
data acquired by Landsat satellites.  GPM is a follow-on to an existing program (the
Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission) to measure global rainfall.    The launch of GPM
has been delayed from 2007 to 2010.  Glory is intended to study aerosols in the
atmosphere and how they affect global climate change.  In the original FY2006
budget submission, NASA had decided to cancel development of the Glory
spacecraft, but continue development of the sensor, with the hope that it someday
would be able to fly on some other spacecraft.  The July 15 FY2006 budget
amendment, however, shifts funding into the Glory program to “fully fund a
standalone ... mission.”  The portion of the $88.3 million added to Sun-Earth System
in the budget amendment that will be allocated to Glory was not specified.
NASA launched its first Landsat satellite in 1972.  Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 are
currently in orbit though both are only partially operational.32  The earth science
community wants to ensure “data continuity” — obtaining similar data over decades
 — for Landsat, but NASA’s plans for a follow-on to Landsat 7 have been in flux.
NASA hoped that the private sector would build the next satellite and NASA could
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33 The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a
joint effort of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Department of Defense (DOD), and NASA.  NOAA and DOD each operate their own
weather satellite systems; NPOESS is the merger of those systems.  NASA develops new
technology for NPOESS.  The first NPOESS is currently scheduled for launch by 2010.
Further discussion of NPOESS is outside the scope of this report.  
purchase data on a commercial basis.  It received only one bid for that contract,
however, and NASA considered it inadequate.  NASA’s current plan is to build
Landsat-type sensors (called Operational Land Imagers, or OLIs) and install them on
a different satellite, called NPOESS.33  Earth scientists are concerned that the
NPOESS satellite with the first OLI will not be launched before Landsat 5 and 7
cease operating and data continuity will be lost.  They want a “bridge mission” to be
launched carrying a Landsat-type sensor to ensure there is no break in data
acquisition.  H.R. 3070, as passed by the House, requires the Administrator to seek
an independent assessment of the costs and risks associated with placing the OLI on
the first NPOESS, versus building a bridge mission and waiting for the second
NPOESS to host an OLI. 
 S. 1281, as passed, directs NASA, in consultation with NOAA and USGS, to
submit a plan that ensures the “long-term vitality” of NASA’s earth observing system
(EOS).  EOS is a set of three spacecraft (Terra, Aura, and Aqua) in Earth orbit that
are conducting long term global observations of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere
to better under Earth as a system.
Potential Cuts in Space Science Programs.  The Vision incorporates a
number of space science disciplines.  As described in NASA’s FY2005 request,
programs to explore other planets and to build and operate space-based observatories
such as the Hubble Space Telescope, are Vision-related.  However, these programs
are feeling the strain of NASA’s constrained budget environment as the agency shifts
funds to pay for the increasing costs of returning the space shuttle to flight status, to
preserve the option of sending a shuttle mission to service the Hubble Space
Telescope, to pay for cost growth in other science programs, and to pay for
congressionally-directed items.  For example, Congress directed in the FY2005
appropriations conference report that NASA spend $291 million on a Hubble
servicing mission.  NASA must find those funds from within its current budget. 
The FY2006 budget run-out for Science Mission Directorate overall is $1 billion
less than what had been projected in FY2005.  In addition, in the May 10, 2005
operating plan update, Dr. Griffin indicated that he would take funds from future
Mars probes (those that were being planned for 2011 and beyond), and from two
future space-based observatories — the Terrestrial Planet Finder and the Space
Interferometry Mission — to pay for the Hubble Servicing Mission and cost growth
in other science programs, such as a Mars probe scheduled for launch in 2005.  
NASA also is considering terminating some of its older space science probes
even though they are still returning useful data.  Considerable concern has been
expressed in the space science community at the prospect of turning off the Voyager
1 and Voyager 2 probes.  Launched in 1977, Voyager 1 has just reached the outer
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edge of the solar system, and Voyager 2 is to do so in a few years.  NASA expects
to be able to continue to receive data from the probes through 2020, when their
power sources are expected to become too weak to send signals back to Earth.
NASA explains that there are a total of 13 probes in the Earth-Sun System theme that
have far exceeded their design lifetimes and are being considered for termination in
order to save the $49.6 million requested in the FY2006 budget to continue operating
them.  The portion of that total for the two Voyager probes is $4.2 million.  As Dr.
Griffin told the Senate Appropriations CJS subcommittee, NASA cannot afford all
of the programs it currently has on its plate, and priorities must be set.  The space
science community is waiting to see if these probes make the list.  Dr. Griffin said
at a June 28, 2005 House Science Committee hearing that he thought turning off the
Voyager spacecraft was “rather dumb,” but that he was awaiting a report from a
group that is reviewing the future of all 13 spacecraft before announcing a final
decision.34  The July 15 budget amendment states that some of the $88.3 million
added to Earth-Sun System would be used for extended missions. 
H.R. 3070, as passed, directs NASA to develop a policy to guide earth and space
science programs through 2016; requires the National Academy of Sciences to
evaluate the performance of each scientific discipline on a certain time schedule; and
requires NASA to carry out annual termination reviews for extended missions, and
that such a review be made for certain extended missions (including Voyager) within
60 days of enactment, with a report to Congress required 30 days later.
S. 1281, as passed, directs NASA to conduct a “rich and vigorous set of science
activities.”  It also directs NASA to assess the cost and benefits of extending the
missions of the Voyager spacecraft,  and another spacecraft called Ulysses that is
studying the Sun.
Congressional Action.   Conferees on the appropriations bill that includes
NASA (H.R. 2862) took the following actions on programs in the Science Mission
Directorate:
Specified increases are —
 
! $50 million for a servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope,
bringing the total for the Hubble program in FY2006 to $271 million
! $30 million for the Glory earth science mission
! $20 million for alternative small spacecraft technology
! $15 million for Earth Science Applications to fund earth science
competitive grants
! $10 million for the Space Interferometry Mission, for a total of $119
million for FY2006
! $5 million for the Living with a Star solar-terrestrial physics
program, for a total of $239 million, of which $10 million shall be
allocated to the Applied Physics Laboratory for program
management of programs specified in the conference report 
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Specified decreases are — 
! $25 million from the Discovery program
! $15 million from optical communications
The conference report also made a $90 million general reduction, plus a $26
million reduction from corporate G&A, from the Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration account.  How much of that will be taken from the Science Mission
Directorate was not specified.
The conferees also specifically noted that they were providing $680 million for
the Mars program, and $371.9 million for the James Webb Space Telescope, the
same as the request.  
Exploration Systems.  This budget category funds the part of NASA
primarily responsible for implementing the “Moon/Mars” portion of the Vision.  The
Constellation Systems line item funds development of the CEV and the CLV
(discussed earlier).   Exploration Systems Research and Technology funds a variety
of technology development efforts, including funding for Centennial Challenges, a
program through which NASA offers prizes for developing specific technologies.
Project Prometheus, which is developing nuclear power and propulsion, is discussed
in an earlier section of this report.  Human Systems Research and Technology
comprises the programs that remain from the previous Office of Biological and
Physical Research.  It is the budgetary location of funds for research to be performed
by NASA aboard the International Space Station, though it also funds ground-based
research.











Constellation Systems 526.0 1,120.1 1,412.1
Exploration Systems Research & Technology 722.8 919.2 797.2
Project Prometheus 431.7 319.6 179.6
Human Systems Research & Technology 1,003.9 806.5 776.5
ISS Crew/Cargo Services** NA NA 168.4
Lunar Robotic Exploration Program** NA NA 135.0
Total 2,684.5 3,165.4 3,468.8
Source:  NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on Dec. 23, 2004.  Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the format of
the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
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** The July 15 budget amendment moves funding for these two programs into the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate (as discussed earlier in this report), but does not specify if they are
now included in one of the four themes identified in the original FY2006 request, or if new
themes are created for them.  They are shown here as separate line items due to lack of other
information to the contrary. 
NA means Not Applicable.
Congressional action on funding for the Vision is discussed earlier in this report.
Aeronautics Research.  NASA’s aeronautics research program and its
FY2006 budget request are discussed earlier in this report.
Education Programs.  Prior to FY2004, NASA’s education activities
appeared under the budget heading “Academic Programs.”  NASA reorganized its
education activities in 2003, consolidating programs that had been in its Office of
Human Resources & Education, and the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs, into
a new Office of Education.  That office was abolished in the August 2004
reorganization, however.  Now, a “Chief Education Officer” oversees these activities.
According to NASA’s current organizational structure, the Chief Education Officer
reports to the Chief of Strategic Communications.  In addition to the funding
identified in the budget under Education Programs, other NASA programs in the
various Mission Directorates also fund educational activities.  These are not
separately identified in NASA’s budget justification documents, and therefore are not
addressed in this section. 
NASA’s education programs include a broad array of activities designed to
improve science education at all levels — kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) and
higher education.  They include programs that directly support student involvement
in NASA research, train educators and faculty, develop new educational
technologies, provide NASA resources and materials in support of educational
curriculum development, and involve higher education resources and personnel in
NASA research efforts.  The National Space Grant and Fellowship Program, which
funds research, education, and public service projects through university-based Space
Grant consortia, is administered through this office.  The Space Grant program
[http://calspace.ucsd.edu/spacegrant/] was established by Congress in NASA’s
FY1988 authorization bill (P.L. 100-147).  It funds Space Grant Consortia in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, to broaden the base of universities
and individuals contributing to and benefitting from aerospace science and
technology.
Programs devoted to minority education (the Minority University Research and
Education Program — MUREP) focus on expanding participation of historically
minority-dominant universities in NASA research efforts. These programs develop
opportunities for participation by researchers and students from those institutions in
NASA activities.  The objective is to expand NASA’s research base through
continued investment in minority institutions’ research and academic infrastructure
to contribute to the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics pipeline.
This office also administers NASA’s participation in the Experimental Program
to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR).  According to its website
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35 NSF’s EPSCoR program is described in CRS Report RL30930, U.S. National Science
Foundation: Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR), by
Christine Matthews.
[http://calspace.ucsd.edu/epscor/], NASA’s EPSCoR program targets states of
modest research infrastructure with funds to develop a more competitive research
base within their member academic institutions.  NASA is one of several federal
agencies that participate in the EPSCoR program.  Among the others are the National
Science Foundation,35 the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Defense,
and the Department of Energy. 
For FY2006, NASA requested $166.9 million for education programs,
compared to a FY2005 appropriation of $216.7 million (per the Initial Operating
Plan).  The difference between the request and the FY2005 appropriation is primarily
due to congressionally directed funding for which NASA did not request funds in
FY2006. The specific amounts for EPSCoR and the Space Grant program are not
provided in NASA’s budget justification document.  The Senate Appropriations
Committee specified that within the funds for education, $12 million be for EPSCoR,
$29.55 million for the Space Grant program, and $54.233 million for other
education-related activities.  In the final version of the bill, conferees added $12.2
million for Space Grant, for a total of $30.2 million; and added $8.2 million for
EPSCoR, for a total of $12.5 million.  They specified that the Space Grant funds are
to fund 40 grantees at $611,250 each, and 12 grantees at $425,000 each.
In the authorization bills, S. 1281 directs that NASA use appropriated funds to
ensure the continuation of the EPSCoR,  Space Grant, and NASA Explorer School
programs, but does not specify amounts.  The bill includes other language supportive
of certain education programs.  H.R. 3070, as passed, specifies that $24 million in
both FY2006 and FY2007 be allocated for the Space Grant program, and in FY2006,
$8.9 million be allocated for the Science and Technology Scholarship Program.  It
also contains a section (Title VI, Subtitle B) regarding other education programs at
NASA.
Exploration Capabilities
Last year, this budget account included most of the funding related to
implementing the Vision,  labeled “Exploration Technologies.”  Those activities now
have been moved into the SA&E account under the “Exploration Systems” line.
What remains in this budget account is funding for the Space Operations Mission
Directorate and its three themes:  International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and
Space and Flight Support.   
The ISS and space shuttle programs are discussed earlier in this report.  Space
and Flight Support is a budget category that includes funding for space
communications, rocket propulsion systems testing, launch services (i.e., acquisition
of commercial launch services for NASA payloads that are not launched on NASA’s
shuttle), and crew health and safety.
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International Space Station** 1,676.3 1,856.7 1,688.3
Space Shuttle† 4,543.0 4,530.6 4,530.6
Space and Flight Support 485.1 375.6 375.6
Total 6,704.4 6,763.0 6,594.5
Source:  NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on Dec. 23, 2004.  Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the format of
the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
** Does not include funding for space station research activities, which are included in the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate.  At the time of its budget submission, a NASA briefing chart
indicated that $382 million in FY2005, and $324 million in FY2006 was for space station
research, although those numbers are expected to decrease as the result of later funding
decisions.
† The FY2005 estimate in the Initial Operating Plan did not fully fund the $762 million shortfall that
NASA identified in November 2004.   Additional money subsequently was moved into the
FY2005 shuttle account.
The original request for the ISS program included $160 million for ISS
Crew/Cargo Services according to NASA briefing charts.  This subaccount was
created in the FY2005 budget to cover costs associated with obtaining alternative
means to the space shuttle for servicing the ISS (for either crew or cargo).  Dr. Griffin
announced in the May 10, 2005 operating plan that he was shifting responsibility for
this program from the Space Operations Mission Directorate to the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate.  The July 15 budget amendment similarly shifted the
FY2006 requested funding into ESMD, and reduced the ISS request (the budget
amendment stated that the FY2006 requested level was $168.4 million, not $160
million).
In the appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), the Senate disapproved all $160 million.
The Senate Appropriations Committee explained in its report (H.Rept. 109-272) that
NASA had not spent the $98 million provided for FY2005 and since it would be
carried over into FY2006, should be sufficient for any activity initiated in FY2006.
The final version of the bill cut $80 million from the ISS program, including $60
million from the ISS Crew/Cargo Services line.   The conferees also cut $10 million
from space communications, which is part of the Space and Flight Support line.  A
general reduction of $10 million from this account also was made.
Inspector General
In NASA’s FY2006 budget documentation, the Office of Inspector General
describes its responsibilities as preventing and detecting crime, fraud, waste, abuse
and mismanagement, while promoting economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within
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NASA.  The FY2006 request was $32.4 million, an increase of $1.1 million over
FY2005.  The final version of the appropriations bill (H.R. 2862) approves the
requested level.
Out-Year Budget Projections
NASA’s FY2006 budget estimate contains the out-year budget projections
shown in Table 10.  Such projections are always subject to change, but can be
indicative of the direction in which the Bush Administration wants NASA to head.
 Compared to the projections in the FY2005 budget (see last row), the projected
increases in NASA’s budget for implementing the Vision for Space Exploration are
less in FY2006-2007, and slightly more in FY2008 and FY2009, but still less than
the projected rate of inflation (approximately 2%).  Also, NASA lists the $126
million in FY2005 emergency funds associated with the 2004 hurricanes in Florida
separately from the $16.070 billion provided in the FY2005 Consolidated
Appropriations Act.  If those figures are added, the increase from FY2005 to FY2006
actually is 1.6%, not 2.4% as shown in this table.
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Table 10.  FY2006-FY2010 NASA Funding Projection
($ in millions)
Budget account FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration
9,334.7 9,661.0 10,549.8 11,214.6 12,209.6 12,796.1
 — Science 5,527.2 5,476.3 5,960.3 6,503.4 6,853.0 6,797.6
 — Exploration Systems 2,684.5 3,165.4 3,707.0 3,825.9 4,473.7 5,125.5
 — Aeronautics Research 906.2 852.3 727.6 730.6 727.5 717.6
 — Education Programs 216.7 166.9 154.9 154.7 155.4 155.4
Exploration Capabilities 6,704.4 6,763.0 6,378.6 6,056.7 5,367.1 5,193.8
 — Space Operations 6,704.4 6,763.0 6,378.6 6,056.7 5,367.1 5,193.8
International Space Station 1,676.3 1,856.7 1,835.3 1,790.9 2,152.3 2,375.5
Space Shuttle 4,543.0 4,530.6 4,172.4 3,865.7 2,815.1 2,419.2
Space and Flight Support 485.1 375.6 370.9 400.0 399.7 399.1
Inspector General 31.3 32.4 33.5 34.6 35.2 37.3
Total 16,070.4 16,456.3 16,962.0 17,305.9 17,611.9 18,027.1
Year to year increase (%)




Grand total 16,196.4 16,456.3 16,962.0 17,305.9 17,611.0 18,027.1
Year to Year Increase (%)
Projected in FY2005 Budget
5.6 4.7 4.8 1.0 0.2 **
Source:  NASA FY2006 Budget Justification, p. 1, except that CRS added the last two rows.  The
Grand total was calculated by CRS; the Year to Year Increase Projected in the FY2005 Budget is from
NASA’s FY2005 Budget Justification, p. 1.   As noted in  NASA’s FY2006 Budget Justification, the
FY2005 figures in this table are from NASA’s Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress on
December 23, 2004, and are not final.
* As noted in the text of this report, the actual increase from FY2005 to FY2006 is only 1.6% when
the $126 million in emergency hurricane relief funds are added to the $16.070 billion provided
in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
** The projected budgets are for five years only, so the FY2005 budget did not include a figure for
FY2010.
† FY2005 supplemental for the 2004 hurricanes that hit Florida.
The Senate authorization bill, S. 1281, recommends annual funding for NASA
for FY2006-FY2010.  The totals for FY2006 and FY2007 are broken down by
account.  Table 11 shows the figures recommended in that bill as reported from
committee.  The House authorization bill, H.R. 3070, as passed by the House,
authorizes funding for FY2006 and FY2007 in a budget structure different from that
used in the NASA request (see Table 3).
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Table 11.  Five-Year Funding Recommendations in S. 1281
($ in millions)




Exploration Capabilities 6,863 6,470
Inspector General 32 34
Total 16,556 17,053 17,470 17,995 18,535
Source: S. 1281. Totals may not add due to rounding.
*Funding for FY2008-FY2010 was not broken down by account.
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Appendix B:  Highlights of NASA’s Activities: 1958-2004
Time period Human Space Flight
Robotic Spacecraft for Space and Earth Science
and Applications Aeronautics
1958-1959 • Adoption of goal to launch people into space:
- initiation of Project Mercury and selection of first
group of astronauts — the “Mercury 7”
• Launch of first U.S. satellites, including:
- Beginning of Explorer series** (which continues
today), including Explorer 1, which led to discovery
of Van Allen belts of radiation
- Beginning of  Pioneer series of probes to study
Moon, though most of those launched in this era
failed
• First flight of rocket-
powered X-15 aircraft. The
X-15 program produced data
on aerodynamic heating,
high-temperature materials,
reaction controls, and space
suits.
1960-1969 • Adoption of 1961 goal announced by President
Kennedy to land a man on the Moon and return him
safely to Earth by the end of the decade.
• Six flights (1961-1963) in Project Mercury: two
suborbital, four orbital.  The Mercury spacecraft
accommodated one astronaut.
- Alan Shepard first U.S. astronaut in space
(suborbital), 1961
- John Glenn first U.S. astronaut in orbit, 1962
 • Ten flights (1965-1966), in Gemini Program, all
orbital. The Gemini spacecraft accommodated two
astronauts.
• Launches of experimental communications
satellites: Echo, and Applications Technology
Satellite (ATS) series.  (Most civilian
communications satellites were and are built and
launched by the private sector; NASA’s role was
R&D).
• Launches of experimental weather satellites: TIROS
and Nimbus series.  (Weather satellite program
transferred to what is now NOAA† late in the decade
once technology was demonstrated.)
• Continued launches of Explorer satellites.
• Continued launches of Pioneer series to Moon,
including four successes (Pioneer 6-9).
• Launches of three other series of probes to fly-by,
• Three X-15 aircraft
complete a total of 199
flights, setting records for
altitude (67 miles) and speed
(Mach 6.7).
• Early development of the
wingless “lifting body”
concept, which later
contributed to the design of
the space shuttle.
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Time period Human Space Flight
Robotic Spacecraft for Space and Earth Science
and Applications Aeronautics
- demonstrated extravehicular activity (EVA, or
spacewalks)
- demonstrated rendezvous and docking in space
- extended duration of human space flight missions to
14 days
• First flights in Apollo Program.  The Apollo
spacecraft accommodated three astronauts. The
Apollo Program also involved NASA’s development
of the Saturn launch vehicle.
- 1967 Apollo fire killed three astronauts in pre-
launch test
- two Apollo missions to earth orbit (Apollo 7 and 9) 
- two Apollo missions to lunar orbit (Apollo 8 and
10)
- two Apollo missions land on Moon (Apollo 11 and
Apollo 12)
orbit, or land on the Moon:
- nine Rangers (three successful)
- seven Surveyors (five successful)
- five Lunar Orbiters (all successful)
• Launches of seven Mariner probes to Venus or Mars
(five successful).
• Launches of two spacecraft in Orbiting
Astronomical Observatory (OAO) series (one
successful).
• Launches of six spacecraft in Orbiting Geophysical
Observatory (OGO) series (three successful).
• Launches of six spacecraft in Orbiting Solar
Observatory (OSO) series (five successful).
1970-1979 • Apollo program continues: 
- Apollo 13 accident in 1970; crew safely returns to
Earth after Service Module explodes enroute to the
Moon
- four more lunar landings (Apollo 14, 15, 16, 17)
- three Apollo missions (Apollo 18-20) canceled due
to budget constraints
• Continuation of Mariner series:
- Mariner 9, first U.S. probe to orbit Mars (a
companion probe, Mariner 8, lost in launch failure)
- Mariner 10, first probe to visit both Venus and
Mercury.
• Continuation of Pioneer series: 
 — Pioneer 10 and 11, first probes to Jupiter and
Saturn.







• First demonstration of a full
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Time period Human Space Flight
Robotic Spacecraft for Space and Earth Science
and Applications Aeronautics
• President Nixon approves development of reusable
space transportation system — the Space Shuttle —
in 1972.
• Skylab space station launched in 1973; three 3-
person crews occupy Skylab from 1973-1974
(launched to the space station using Apollo
spacecraft).   Skylab made an uncontrolled reentry
through Earth’s atmosphere in 1979, spreading debris
on Australia and the Indian Ocean.
• U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975,
with docking of U.S. Apollo and Soviet Soyuz
spacecraft for two days of joint experiments.  Last
Apollo mission; no more Americans in space until
1981.
 — Pioneer Venus 1 and 2 to Venus
• Launches of Viking 1 and 2, first U.S. probes to
land on Mars, each with a companion orbiter in
Martian orbit.
• Launches of Voyager 1 (to Jupiter and Saturn)  and
Voyager 2 (to Jupiter, Saturn, Neptune, and Uranus);
today they continue to send data back from their
current positions as they head out of the solar system  
 — Voyager 1 is 14 billion kilometers, and Voyager 2
is 11 billion kilometers, from the Sun.
• Continued launches of Explorer satellites.
• Two more launches in OSO series (both successful).
• Two more launches in OAO series (one successful).
• Three launches in High Energy Astronomy
Observatory (HEAO) series (all successful).
• Launches of Landsat 1, 2, and 3 — series of earth
orbiting remote sensing satellites (all successful).
 • Launches of other earth science satellites, including
Heat Capacity Mapping Mission (HCMM); and 
Seasat, which carried a radar for ocean sensing (but




gauges, and instruments 
• First flight test of winglets
(small wings at the end of
each main wing) to reduce
aerodynamic drag, improving
fuel efficiency and range.
1980-1989 • First decade of Space Shuttle flights; missions
included launch of government and commercial
satellites, retrieval of malfunctioning satellites, and
several flights of “Spacelab” (a shirt-sleeve
• Launch of Earth-orbiting Solar Maximum Mission
to study the Sun.
• Continued launches of Explorer satellites. 
• Launch of Magellan probe to Venus.
• Joint NASA-FAA Airborne
Wind Shear program
initiated in response to
multiple fatal accidents.
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Time period Human Space Flight
Robotic Spacecraft for Space and Earth Science
and Applications Aeronautics
laboratory, built by Europe, that fits inside the
shuttle’s cargo bay):
- first shuttle flight in April 1981
- total of 24 successful shuttle launches until January
1986 Space Shuttle Challenger tragedy
- shuttle returns to flight in September 1988
- six more successful flights through end of 1989
• President Reagan, in 1984, directs NASA to build a
permanently occupied space station  “within a
decade” and to invite other countries to join.   Europe,
Canada, and Japan do so.  Many redesigns and
program restructurings because of cost growth; no
space station launches during this time period. 
• Launch of Galileo probe to Jupiter.
• Launches of Landsat 4 and 5 earth  remote sensing
satellites (both successful).
• Launch of other earth science satellites, including
Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS — two more
instruments in this series were later launched on









include the Boeing 777,
space shuttle, and F-18.






1990-1999 • Continued flights of the Space Shuttle:
-  64 successful missions during the decade, including
nine to visit Russia’s Mir space station.  Others
dedicated to various scientific missions (including
use of Spacelab), launching NASA or DOD satellites,
and servicing Hubble Space Telescope.  
• Space station further redesigned and reconfigured: 
- Russia joins international space station partnership
• Launch of Advanced Communications Technology
Satellite (ACTS). 
• Launch of Polar and Wind spacecraft as part of
international program to study solar-terrestrial
physics.
• Launch of three of four “Great Observatories”: 
Hubble Space Telescope, Compton Gamma Ray
Observatory, and Chandra X-Ray Observatory.
• Launch of Cassini spacecraft to Saturn.
• First flight test of flight




operation if main control
system fails.
• First of 385 research flights
on modified F-18 to
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in 1993
- first two space station segments launched in 1998;
then hiatus (until 2000) while awaiting the next
Russian segment to be completed
• Continued launches of Explorer satellites.
• Initiation of “Discovery” series of spacecraft,
including launches of Near Earth Asteroid
Rendezvous (NEAR) mission, Lunar Prospector, and
Stardust (to return sample of comet to Earth).
• Launch of Deep Space 1 test of ion engines for deep
space missions.
• Continued launches of Mars probes, including two
successful missions in 1996 (Mars Pathfinder, which
was part of the Discovery series, and Mars Global
Observer), and three failures (Mars Observer in 1993,
and Mars Polar Lander and Mars Climate Orbiter in
1999).
• Continued launches of earth science satellites,
including Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite
(UARS), Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer-Earth
Probe (TOMS-EP),  TOPEX/Poseidon and
QuikSCAT for ocean sensing, and the first of three
Earth Observing System (EOS) platforms — Terra.
• Launch of Landsat 7††
demonstrate stabilized flight
at high angles of attack,
improving safety for fighter
aircraft during extreme
maneuvers.
• SR-71 flights investigate
how to reduce the intensity of
sonic booms.
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2000-2004 • Continued flights of the Space Shuttle:
- 16 successful launches, many associated with
construction of the space station, until Space Shuttle
Columbia tragedy in February 2003
- Shuttle fleet grounded for 2 ½ years until first 
Return to Flight mission in July 2005 (STS-114).
• Continued space station construction and operation:
- “permanent occupancy” begins in November 2000. 
Two or three astronauts have been aboard the facility
since that time on rotating shifts, in addition to
visiting crews on U.S. space shuttle or Russian Soyuz
spacecraft
• President Bush announces “Vision for Space
Exploration” in January 2004, directing NASA to
return humans to the Moon by 2020 and someday
send them to Mars and “worlds beyond.”
• Launch of fourth Great Observatory (Spitzer Space
Telescope).
• Continued launches of Mars probes (including Mars
Odyssey orbiter, and Spirit and Opportunity rovers).
• Continued launches of Discovery-class missions,
including Genesis to return samples of solar wind to
Earth, and Messenger to orbit Mercury.
• Continued launches of Explorers.
• Continued launches of earth science satellites,
including EO-1, ICESAT, ocean sensing satellite
JASON-1 (a follow on to TOPEX/Poseidon), and
final two EOS platforms — Aqua and Aura.
• Launch of Gravity-Probe B to test Einstein’s
general theory of relativity.
• Unpiloted solar-electric
research vehicle Helios sets
altitude record for propeller-
driven aircraft (97,000 feet),
with possible applications in
ground imaging and
atmospheric monitoring or as
an alternative to satellites for
telecommunications.
• X-43A demonstrates air-
breathing scramjet engines
for hypersonic flight, with
sustained speed of Mach 9.6.
Source:  Prepared by CRS.
* This table shows illustrative examples of NASA space missions, and is not meant to be comprehensive.
** NASA’s Explorer website [http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/multi/explorer.html] reports that as of March 2000, 78 Explorer satellites had been launched, 74 successfully.   Several more
have been launched since.  These satellites cover a wide range of disciplines, including atmospheric physics, solar-terrestrial physics, and astronomy.  The Explorer program was
begun by the U.S. Army prior to the creation of NASA.  The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) developed the launch vehicle used for the early Explorer launches, and
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the Army’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory built the satellites.   ABMA, JPL, and the Explorer program were transferred to NASA upon its creation; but the first five Explorer satellites
(three of which were successful), strictly speaking were DOD, not NASA, satellites.
† NOAA is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, part of the Department of Commerce.
†† After NASA’s launch of Landsat 1-5 in the 1970s and 1980s, an attempt was made to privatize the Landsat system.  One satellite, Landsat 6, was launched under that privatization
program, which was overseen by NOAA, not NASA.  That launch failed, and the program was brought back under NASA sponsorship, and NASA launched Landsat 7. Therefore,
Landsat 7 is included in this table, while Landsat 6 is not.  Landsat 5 and 7 are still operational, and are operated by the U.S. Geological Survey.
